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  Historically, one of the most significant periods in which incarceration was used as a tool 
to manage political opponents of the regime in Turkey was the 1980s, specifically during and 
after the 1980 military coup. This study investigates the high-risk environments of the two 
notorious military prisons: Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons between 1980 and 1985. These two 
military prisons: Mamak Prison, where Turkish revolutionaries were incarcerated and Diyarbakir 
Prison, where Kurdish revolutionaries were incarcerated, were infamous for the torture and level 
of repression implemented by the military junta. The aim of the military junta was to dissolve 
revolutionary organizations and military prisons were one of the state institutions that were used 
to realize this aim. Thus, while comparing the dynamics of collective action of the political 
prisoners in two prisons, I also consider how different prisons/ prison contexts affect the success 
a regime has in demobilizing dissident groups. 
Using in-depth interviews I conducted, along with contemporary writings from former 
political prisoners, my research will demonstrate how the development of solidary interpersonal 
relations and shared identity were solidified during prison life and facilitated formation of 
collective action. Moreover, the risk-taking ability of the leaders appear as contingently 
interconnected themes to identity and relations in explaining how political prisoners in 
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Diyarbakir Prison formed more frequent and sustainable collective actions than the political 
prisoners in Mamak Prison.  This thesis contributes to the discussions of different mobilization 
processes under high-risk contexts in undemocratic environments and addresses the understudied 
aspect of collective action in Turkish prisons. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, one of the most significant periods in which incarceration was used as a tool to 
manage political opponents of the regime in Turkey was the 1980s, specifically during and after 
the 1980 military coup. This study investigates the high-risk environments of the two notorious 
military prisons: Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons between 1980 and 1985. In the following text, I 
define the two aforementioned prisons as “high-risk” in accordance with the severe state 
repression that occurred in these spaces. Christian Davenport states that the “actual or threatened 
use of physical sanctions towards an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction 
of a state would count as state repression” (Davenport 2009: 377-85). State repression can exist 
in many forms, such as: mass arrests, espionage, mass killings, torture, bans, outlawing political 
organizations, and censorship. Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons were the spaces where extreme 
levels of these repressive measurements were implied on political prisoners. This is why I will 
proceed without reservation in this study to call such environments “high-risk.”  
The aim of the military junta was to dissolve revolutionary organizations and military 
prisons were one of the state institutions that were used to realize this aim.  Between 1974 and 
1980, the street protests and university occupations were among the largest protests in the history 
of the Republic of Turkey.  Coalition member of the era, Republican People’s Party (CHP) was 
depicting the situation as a “de facto civil war” (Boratav 2006). Armed attacks and violent 
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clashes between revolutionary and right wing insurgents and the police were common 
occurrences. Assassinations by both right and left wing groups had mounted to over 5,000 by 
September 1980. Turkey's military leaders abolished the parliament after a coup. The junta then 
imposed martial law on the entire country (Amnesty International 1982). The military coup of 
1980 in Turkey crushed the increasing protest cycles of the 1970s, seeking to deactivate the labor 
unions as well as the socialist revolutionary organizations.  
The junta, consisting of five generals, declared martial law in 67 provinces in Turkey. 
Members of armed, unarmed, legal, and illegal right wing and left wing organizations were 
charged in military courts and held in military prisons, thus resulting in an exponential increase 
of political prisoners in military-run prisons. With the coup, all political and trade union activity 
was banned, political parties shut down and their leaders were arrested and major newspapers 
were closed. One of the most visible legal impacts of the coup was the decrease in the number of 
union member workers from five million in 1980 to one million in 1984 (Yılmaz 2013).  
Within the first six weeks after the coup, 11,500 people were arrested (Zurcher 2004). This 
number rose to 30.000 by the end of 1980. Then, only a year later, this number rose to 122,600 
arrests. By September 1982, a total of 80,000 people were still imprisoned, 30.000 of who were 
awaiting trial (Zurcher 2004). Almost one third of the prisoners were political prisoners and 
nearly all of them kept in military prisons. Between 1980 and 1986 a total of 650,000 people 
were arrested in Turkey; 230.000 of them were tried, and 7,000 were convicted and sentenced 
with capital punishment (Yılmaz 2013). The fifty condemned prisoners who were ultimately 
executed included members of the parliament, political parties, and trade unions (Yılmaz 2013). 
The findings of Amnesty International in Turkey confirmed reports of torture being used by 
police and military personnel. Such practice became widespread and skyrocketed during the 
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1980s. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) declared that by 2008, there were over 
one million victims of torture in Turkey. Amnesty International repeatedly documented that, in 
practice, incommunicado detention was often longer than the legal duration and systematic 
torture was being practiced in military prisons (Amnesty International 1985).  
As can be gleaned from the numbers, the use of imprisonment and violence was intimately 
linked to an imperative for state control. The absolute authority of military officials in fact began 
a new era in prisons of Turkey. The military’s disciplinary control aimed to turn prisoners into 
obedient, Turkish nationalist, soldier-like citizens, and those who refused were violently 
punished with methodical torture practices. In this politically antagonistic environment, three 
prisons turned into infamous places of torture: namely, Mamak Prison, in Ankara; Metris Prison, 
in Istanbul; and, the Diyarbakir Prison, in Diyarbakır—which was often referred to as the 
‘dungeon’ or ‘#5’.  
 Within the scope of this MA thesis I focus on Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. The ethnic 
difference between the prisoner populations in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prison highly matters in 
this analysis. The reason behind the fact that Diyarbakir Prison was enlisted within the top ten 
notorious prisons of the world was extreme violence imposed by the soldier-guards deriving 
from Turkish state’s historical denial of the Kurdish identity. 
 The significance of Kurdish identity in this process did not develop in the prison, it instead 
stems from a historical ethnic discrimination. Kurdish identity and language had been denied for 
60 years in the Turkish Republic by the time the military coup of 1980. Educated Kurdish youth 
had started to get politically organized in the 1950s, and by the 1970s there was a plethora of 
Kurdish revolutionary organizations. Some of these groups chose to use political violence and 
started forming armed groups as a method to combat the Turkish state towards the end of 1970s. 
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Those Kurdish insurgents, mostly students, of 1970s became the political prisoners in Diyarbakir 
Prison with the 1980 military coup. Later in the post-coup era, starting in 1984, a significant 
portion of those released political prisoners from Diyarbakir Prison has mobilized to Kurdistan 
Workers Party’s (PKK) guerilla camps (Zeydanlioglu 2009).  
          Since the aim of these military prisons was to dissolve the revolutionary organizations, 
Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons have significant roles in determination of which political 
organizations survive and continue as political players and which would not survive. The 
commanders of martial law in each city determined the characteristics of the prisons. More than 
that, they appointed the chief commanders of the prisons: Raci Tetik1 for Mamak Prison and Esat 
Oktay Yildiran2 for Diyarbakir Prison. Both commanders were given the authority to train 
guards to conduct torture on the prisoners and incite misconduct in the prisons. The main aim of 
this thesis is to explain different processes of resisting statist authority by forming collective 
action in two prisons, Mamak and Diyarbakir. 
Studying collective action in prison environments is significant for several reasons. 
Evidently, there is a significant deficit of sociological research on Turkish prisons and their 
corresponding historical relationship with the social movements. The written material on 
political prisoners’ resistance is limited to political organizations’ self-promotional literature, the 
counter-propaganda of the state, and the memoirs of former political prisoners. Sociologists can 
help analyze these competing narratives and advance understandings of how the use of 
incarceration as a tool of political repression impacts oppositional mobilization and vice versa. 
Here in this study, I present how the Turkish state tried to dissolve revolutionary social 
                                                 
1 He served in special armed units with the NATO forces in Korea War (1950) and Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus (1974). He was publicly missing 
after the prison mission. The place he lives is still unknown. 
2 He served in special armed units in Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus too. They both confessed in interviews and dialogues with the prisoners that 
they practiced the torture methods in the prisons, which they learned and practiced in those previous overseas missions. Esat Oktay Yildiran was 
shot and killed by a PKK member in a public bus later in 1988. 
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movement organizations and their networks through incarceration. I focus on Diyarbakir and 
Mamak prisons and the response of political prisoners to the oppressive measures. 
This thesis contributes to collective action literature and addresses the discussions on 
different mobilization structures under high-risk contexts in undemocratic environments. 
Moreover, it investigates both sides of collective action and repression through comparisons. 
After identifying several ways in which the two prisons differ–in terms of severity and 
imposition of repression and different tactics promoted by prisoners’ leaders–I will then further 
investigate how the relationship between repression and resistance interacted differently in 
Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. 
This mission is possible to the extent that we distinguish between actions of the state and 
those of movement actors. The actions of the state, here also the actions of the soldiers who run 
these prisons, shape the ebbs and flows of the insurgents’ actions. According to Charles Tilly, 
political opportunity structures limit movement actions as well as movement struggles shapes 
opportunity-threat structure (Tilly 1998). “Opportunity structure refers to features of regimes and 
institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action and to changes in those 
features” (Tarrow and Tilly 2007: 440).  
Thus, I situate the four factors that I claim them to have explanatory roles in the process of 
engaging in collective action, into the changes in the political opportunity-threat structure. 
Within these four aspects first, I look into the state actions, which will unpack the opportunity 
structure namely, and more specifically, the different modes and varying levels of how state 
repression was exercised in the two prisons. Since Kurdish prisoners’ ethnic identity has a salient 
role in determining the ways and levels of exercising state repression in two prisons next, I 
consider the development of a shared identity around “Kurdishness” as a very important factor in 
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Diyarbakir Prison to forge collective action. Development of solidary interpersonal relations 
among prisoners, which were solidified during the course of prison life, and, the quality of 
leadership also appear to be explanans of the different courses of collective action in these two 
prisons. I define quality of leadership based on the following factors: a leader’s willingness to 
take risks on behalf of the others, to act first in a situation of conflict and mobilize the followers. 
I will use the term, “risk-liable leadership” to denote a leader’s capacity and willingness to take 
part in risky actions first among the others. The characteristics of the insurgents’ actions impact 
whether state repression is effective or not. I argue that repression propels collective action if 
there is a risk-liable leadership presence, in addition to the development of a shared identity and 
solidary relations between the insurgents in these prisons.  
Different approaches to the relationship between state repression and dissidence do not 
agree on a single outcome. Contextualizing each case is important to find out different dynamics 
in that relationship. As a result of my research, I contend that the extreme repression in 
Diyarbakir Prison impeded the recruitment to collective action at first, even though the initial 
attempts of collective action remained limited to the leaders. As time went by, indiscriminate and 
extreme repression turned into an opportunity to form alternative solidary relationships, which 
were crucial in recruitment to high-risk collective action in prisons. The conflicts in between the 
political organizations based on their ideological positions were the main reason of their in-
cooperation at first. However, severe attacks against Kurdishness and inmates’ sexualities 
worked for them to overcome those ideological conflicts and helped them act together in the 
context of Diyarbakir Prison. Furthermore, the role of risk-liable leaders and their framing of 
resistance under the concept of “honor” facilitated the formation of collective action in 
Diyarbakir Prison.  
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On the other hand, moderate-level, selective repression in Mamak Prison and cohabitation 
of left and right wing political prisoners hindered the formation of alternative personal 
relationships other than the prior organizational ties. On top of these aforementioned factors, the 
dearth of risk-liable and people-oriented leadership stunted the formation of collective action in 
Mamak. Although Kurdishness became a tool for the prisoners in Diyarbakir Prison to determine 
clear lines between them and the Turkish soldier-guards, ideological conflicts causing in-
cooperation in Mamak prison remained salient throughout the process, thereby hindering any 
significant chance to successfully form a collective action. Exceptionally for Mamak, female 
political prisoners could overcome their contested relations and form a culture of resistance 
among them-selves. As a result, we witness fewer and less sustained instances of collective 
action in Mamak Prison and greater and more sustained collective actions in Diyarbakir Prison.  
 I will explicate the abovementioned processes and dynamics in detail through this thesis. In 
Chapter I, I visit theoretical discussions on incarceration, prison riots, and collective action. In 
Chapter II, I document the brief history of Turkish prisons and the Kurdish question. Further in 
Chapter III, I provide the Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons in detail. Lastly, in Chapter IV, I 
analyze my research findings.   
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2.0  METHODOLOGY 
 
I conducted 28 semi-structured, open-ended in-depth interviews with former prisoners, who were 
incarcerated in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons during 1980 - 1985. Their age ranged between 50 
and 80 years when I conducted the interviews. These interviews took place in February and 
March of 2014 in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir. Each interview lasted between 90 – 120 
minutes.  
My interviewees consisted of twelve former prisoners from Mamak prison and sixteen 
from Diyarbakir prison. Six out of twelve Mamak interviewees were Revolutionary Path (Dev-
Yol) members. Remaining included two Acilci, one People’s Liberation Army of Turkey 
(THKO-Devrim Yolu), one Workers Party of Turkey (TIP), one Halkin Kurtulusu (People’s 
Salvation, HK) and one Revolutionary War (Dev-Savas) members. Diyarbakir interviewees, on 
the other hand, belonged to the following organizations: four Revolutionary Democratic Culture 
Association (DDKD), three Kurdistan National Liberatiors (KUK), two Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), two Rizgari, one Ala Rizgari, one THKO and one Kurdistan Socialist Party of 
Turkey (TKSP-Ozgurluk Yolu) member. Furthermore, my Diyarbakir prison interviewees 
included one non-affiliated prisoner and one former smuggler. Vast majority of the Diyarbakir 
prisoners were PKK members.  
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I use the testimonies of former political prisoners as my primary data sources for this 
study. Literature written by former prisoners, independent researchers and journalists are 
referenced in this study as secondary sources. Public access to reliable state reports and 
documentation from this time period is very limited. Therefore, I do recognize the limitations 
and accuracy of human perspective and recollection, most especially interviewees recalling their 
prison experiences from over 30 years ago. And yet, it must be understood the limited record of 
the recorded experiences from political prisoners during the military regime. Striving for 
knowledge of such first-hands accounts is important for helping both Turkish citizens and the 
international community to understand what happened in that time period between 1980 and 
1985. As Beatriz Sarlo claims with reference to Susan Sontag, “understanding is more important 
than remembering; but to understand first we have to remember”(Sarlo 2012). Even though 
testimonies might be partial, recounting them in this thesis is a big part of the understanding 
process.  
In order to locate my interviewees for this study, I employed a snowball sampling method. 
First, I contacted my sources at HDP (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi)3, CISST (Ceza Infaz 
Sisteminde Sivil Toplum Dernegi)4, VAKAD (Van Kadin Dernegi)5, and several others that 
directed me to a larger web of connections, thereby allowing me to make a concerted effort to 
contact potential interviewees. The interviews took place in a variety of locations, such as: cafes, 
office spaces, and some of the interviewees’ homes. I recorded all the interviews, except for one 
that I could not because of a technical problem. All of my sources consented to allow me to use 
                                                 
3 People’s Democratic Party 
4 CSPSO (Civil Society in the Penal System Organization) 
5 Van Women’s Association 
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their real names in the thesis, but I have instead chosen to use pseudonyms to avoid potential 
risks. 
Additionally, I was successful in locating rare but informative autobiographies and 
memoirs written by former political prisoners. I coded the interviews and identified the themes 
and concepts that are central to my study. I analyzed all these accounts in light of the theoretical 
framework that I drew from the literature on prisons, state repression, social movements and 
particularly collective action. Before presenting my framework, I find sharing the limitations of 
my research useful. 
2.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Even though the vast majority of Diyarbakir prisoners were PKK members, I could only reach 
two former PKK member inmates. This was largely in part due to my limited time in Diyarbakir. 
My progress was impeded also since my visit took place shortly before the local election date. I 
soon discovered that many former inmates, who were still activists—most of them had become 
guerillas—, had either returned to their villages or refused to be interviewed.   
Fortunately most of the written memoirs on Diyarbakir Prison belong to former PKK 
members thus, I compensate the flow in the interviews. Furthermore, it is especially important to 
note that I was unable to interview a right-wing, former prisoner for this study. Even though, I 
reached one, he was unwilling to participate in my study. Since, the right-wing prisoners never 
contributed or tried to form collective action in Mamak Prison, this does not influence the 
generalizability of my sample. I could only reach three female informants from Diyarbakir 
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Prison and five from Mamak. The population of female political prisoners in Diyarbakir Prison 
was at most 75 out of the estimated 1,000 – 2,000 prisoners at a time. In Mamak, on the other 
hand, the number of female political prisoners reached at most 200 out of the estimated 1,000 to 
2,000 prisoners. Therefore, detailed experience of female prisoners and their different coping 
mechanisms with repression is not complete in my analysis. Secondary sources on the experience 
of female political prisoners in Mamak provide some lead. However, for the Diyarbakir prison 
sources on female prisoners are highly insufficient compared to Mamak. Due to time limitations 
and the scope of my research I could not reach more female interviewees. There is a great need 
to conduct further research on women’s experience especially in Diyarbakir. 
After officially requesting information from the Ministry of Justice on the number and sex 
information of the inmates during 1980-1987, I then asked permission to visit the prisons to be 
able to provide a more accurate description of such spaces. Unfortunately, the Ministry 
responded that they do not hold such records. Thus, to compose a thorough and balanced study, I 
decide to deduce the total number of prisoners from informants’ guesses and official trial cases. 
Another compensation for this thesis would be to conduct a comprehensive review of 
newspapers and trial cases. I believe the researchers’ own social and political locations and 
persona have also effects on the research outcomes; therefore I also want to share my reflections 
with you. 
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2.2 REFLECTIONS ON THE FIELD 
 
My gender, age, and personal political position without a doubt affected the results of my 
research study. For instance, I could not contact any former prison guards and was able only to 
reach one right-wing political prisoner, who then declined to participate in my study. I tried to 
contact a lawyer of a former right-wing prisoner, but they were not willing to meet with me. 
Moreover, I was aware that the male political prisoners were unlikely to share accounts of their 
experiences of sexual torture with a female interviewer. This was made evident when one of my 
male subjects frankly stated that he would have shared more information if I were to be a male. 
This was confirmed when the aforementioned interviewee was about to recount an instance 
during which guards were burning an old man’s pubic hair and continued to burn him up to his 
face. But his friend, who joined us for part of the conversation, persuaded him to tell the story 
while I was in the women’s restroom. Then, my interviewee said he had been persuaded by his 
friend to tell me the story because I was his daughter’s age. After he considered this fact, he said 
it would not be so ayip (inappropriate). I was in a disadvantaged position because of my gender 
with male informants but my age occasionally compensated for that. There were times that 
female prisoners also told me if I were a male researcher they would not tell me their “intimate” 
memories. However, I must also note that they did make me turn off my sound recorder, while 
recounting sexual harassment and torture experiences. 
In some of the interviews, both my gender and age became a barrier, but the fact that I was 
not an official member of a political organization presented a neutral ground where they could 
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share their experiences. For example, two of the male informants from Dev-Yol’s central 
committee were not disposed to share their stories with me. They asked if I was a daughter of a 
member of their group or if I was a member of any other political organizations. When I said 
“no”, they were relieved because they said “others” try to discredit Dev-Yol with their work on 
Mamak Prison.  
Some of the male interviewees from the Turkish revolutionary organizations, especially the 
Dev-Yol members, also hesitated to talk to me, citing my youth as the reason. And probably 
because I was a young female student, they did not take me seriously at first. Very often I was hit 
with a barrage of questions on the topic before I even conducted an in-depth interview. I had to 
meet some of my subjects several times for such quizzes before my subject complied to answer 
my research questions at the actual interview. Because of their attitudes toward my presence and 
research questions, I felt the need to dress more formally for those interviews. I started to wear a 
little make up and heeled boots rather than sneakers when I met them. This change in my outfit 
had the opposite effect in my Diyarbakir field study and interviews, whereas the Kurdish group 
of former prisoners treated me with extra kindness and respect. My conjecture is that they 
assumed I was a lecturer or professor, despite having informed them I was still in graduate 
school. Overall, male informants from Diyarbakir were more willing to talk, and were friendlier 
than the male informants from Mamak. On the other hand, being a young woman had a positive 
effect on all female informants. I never felt the need to change my appearance, in order to get 
female subjects to respond openly and respectfully.  
I hope laying out the limitations and my reflections on this research before showing its 
strengths and novelty take us to a more comprehensive understanding of the cases I investigated. 
In the text below, I first present a selective review of the existing literature and then draw a 
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frame to analyze my cases. Also, this brief review will provide alternative routes to think about 
this research.  
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3.0  CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Social movement theories, such as resource mobilization, rational choice and political 
opportunity structure offer various approaches to explain collective action. Such theories explore 
why and how people mold their individual wills into collective performances and claims. 
Furthermore, these theories tend to expound on the particular conditions that such actions lead to 
a change in an existing situation. Collective action has been researched in a cross-disciplinary 
tradition, in disciplines ranging from criminology, political science, psychology and sociology. 
Unique forms of collective performances occur in prisons under constrained conditions. To 
have a multifaceted analysis of this inquiry, I will incorporate a blend of structural and 
constructivist theories by highlighting micro-level processes of mobilization. Herein, I will 
provide a general overview of collective action literature as it relates to prison actions.  My aim 
is to develop an analytical framework to better understand the dynamics of collective action in 
Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons between 1980 and 1985.  
Analysis of collective action finds place in social movement theories. These theories 
mainly evolved around rationalist, structural and cultural perspectives. Each viewpoint offers 
various approaches to explaining the formation, recruitment, and mobilization processes of 
collective action. Dynamics between macro-level structures and micro level-mobilization 
processes, mainly between the state repression and the constructed aspects of the social world 
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such as emotions, culture, identity, face to face interactions, space and time have explanatory 
power for this thesis. By drawing a framework for the cases I will explain the variations in 
formation of collective action under different opportunity structures. 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND LITERATURE ON PRISONS 
 
Contrary to popular belief, the history of prisons and imprisonment in the modern sense does not 
go very far back into world history. Imprisonment as it is enforced today, which may occur prior 
to or preceding a sentence by a constituted court, became the dominant form of punishment only 
in the 18th century in Europe (Morris and Rotman 1995) The concept of imprisonment was 
introduced as a humane alternative to physical punishment. In Turkey, the transformation from 
traditional understanding of justice to rationalized penal codes began to emerge in the mid-19th 
century. “Modern” forms of imprisonment only trace back to the introduction of the Tanzimat 
(Reformation) edict during the late Ottoman Empire in 1839. 
Some of the early scholars on prisons, such as Gresham Sykes, Micheal Ignatieff, Dario 
Melossi, Otto Kirkheimer & George Rusche, Erving Goffman, Micheal Foucault and Bert 
Useem & Jack Goldstone investigated prisons, recognizing the importance of prisons as 
prototypes of the society. These scholars built their theories of the society at large on their 
critical observations of prisons. Unsurprisingly, early studies on imprisonment are based on 
white men’s experience. Prior to 1980s, there is a meager chance one will find critical 
frameworks on issues of race or experience from female prisoners. In these early studies, matters 
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of identity, subjectivity and agency are implicit too. Yet in this work, I conceive the issues of 
identity and agency in the prison as crucial points when explaining collective action in prisons. I 
will approach prisons not as places where only power and surveillance dominates, but instead as 
contested spaces where power and resistance are constantly in flux amongst both prisoners and 
guards. To this end, I will mainly utilize Fouacult, Goffman and David Garland’s ideas of 
imprisonment to constitute the medium through which I want to frame my argument about 
collective action in prisons. 
3.1.1 Core Justifications for Imprisonment in Penology 
“Many total institutions, seem to function merely as storage dumps for inmates, but they 
usually present themselves to the public as rational organizations designed consciously, as 
effective machines for producing a few avowed and officially approved ends (Goffman 
1961:74). 
“Juridical punishment is not the transparent and rather self-evident institution of crime control 
that is commonly taken to be… Punishment today is a deeply problematic and barely understood 
aspect of social life, the rationale for which is by no means clear (Garland 1990:3)”. 
 
Historically, penologists have determined the most common justifications for imprisonment, 
such as: incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation (treatment). Incapacitation is 
the most usual justification among different societies, as it effectively curbs the prisoner’s ability 
to inflict criminal harm on those outside prison walls (Morris & Rotman 1995: 4-11). 
Incapacitation was not a form of punishment in itself, but rather a means to prevent a criminal 
suspect from disappearing before a decision could be made in the legal system.  
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Morris and Rotman explain deterrence as a justification to imprisonment, since it ideally 
prevents people from acting against the law (1995). However, Garland shows that prisons are not 
so effective in deterring people from offences. In contrast, his studies show that the possibility of 
an ex-prisoner to re-commit a crime is more than the first timers (Garland 1985). Another way of 
justifying prisons is the concept of retribution, which proposes to redress injustice. In a way, it 
was a moralist justification to “make even” the relationship between the offender and the 
offended. Finally, rehabilitation as a justification for imprisonment came into play through 17th 
during the European Enlightenment era.  
Rehabilitation (treatment) differs from deterrence in the way it aims to change and give a 
new form to the prisoners’ attitudes. Institutional schedules based on hours devoted to education, 
praying, preaching, workshops and etc., were first implemented in North American and British 
prisons, as it very much reflected real or imagined Protestant ethics of hard work, prayer, and the 
ethical purification of one’s self (Garland 1985:27-53).  Communal-based sentencing—for 
example, the ward system in Turkey, where 20-80 prisoners inhabited a single unit—went hand-
in-hand with the rehabilitative form of punishment. The treatment approach superseded security, 
prevention, and deterrence rhetoric of punishments in mid-20th century (Garland 1985). 
However, starting in the late 1970s, risk-management and security approaches replaced the 
emphasis on treatment. 
According to Garland prisons host a continuous relationship with culture and politics 
(1995). Thus, the prisons of 1980 military coup era gained a new meaning and function for the 
prison officials, governors and the inmates. In addition to deterring political prisoners from 
further political action outside the prison, the coup era prisons became like an incubator where 
the prison governors aimed to separate each political prisoner from their affiliated organization 
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network and dissolve their organization structure by the use of ‘rehabilitation’, coercion and 
torture. Strict planning of the daily routines of physical and normative education sessions was 
imposed on inmates. Normative education sessions were composed of memorizing the official 
chauvinistic history and military anthems whereas physical education was to practice exercising 
and marching in the military order. Yet the goal of ‘treatment’ was to create the ideal nationalist 
Turkish citizen, who would give up the revolutionary ideology or dissent they were imprisoned 
for, and instead adopt Turkish nationalistic ideas and religious manners together with the 
military’s disciplinary edicts. Revolutionary ideas of socialism and communism were even 
named as extensions of a mental disorder by the state-hand controlled media, politicians and 
medical doctors. Some psychiatrists of the era published how “pathological” is to be an insurgent 
and that is a form of “psychopathy”6. Thus, the insurgents who demand a revolutionary change 
in the social order were stigmatized as deviants and traitors, who needed to be re-conditioned 
into obedient citizens. In the 1980 coup d’état era, the military used the prisons to transform 
insurgents into resigned and compliant citizens. 
3.1.2 Disciplinary Power and Resistance in the Prison 
Discipline and Punish (1975) became one of the most praised and cited sources on 
imprisonment. Similar to the earlier scholars on prisons, Foucault correlates change in punitive 
mechanisms with the rise of modernity. Foucault explains the prison order by showing how a 
certain social group would use discipline and surveillance technologies to surpass another social 
group. Goffman, on the other hand, scrutinizes the contentious relations in total institutions and 
                                                 
6 See the news pieces:  S. Recep Doksat, “Anarşistler”, Milliyet, July, 12th 1956 
"Süt Dökmüş Kediye Döndüler", Hürriyet, December, 24th 2000 
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suggests that inmates create defensive adjustments to the mortifying aspects of spatial power 
(1961). Spatiality of power refers to authorities’ control over the spaces that prisoners live in via 
coercion and creation of routines (O’hearn 2012). 
I draw most heavily from Goffman’s and Foucault’s critical approaches to frame the spatial 
elements of the prisons. Foucault introduces the concept of “panopticon” to understand the 
dynamics in one of the modern institutions where power takes an architectural form that is 
prisons. Panopticon is a metaphor for internalizing the observation of another to create self-
monitoring in the subjects. Foucault draws this idea from Jeremy Bentham, a 17th century social 
reformist and philosopher, who suggests an ideal architecture for prisons called, “panopticon”; 
the sole purpose of such architecture being to maintain complete surveillance in disciplinary 
institutions. In this model, each prisoner is visible to the observer. However, the subject of 
observation cannot confirm whether or not he/she is observed. Although, it was never completely 
implemented, “panopticon” is paradigmatic to understand disciplinary institutions, as Foucault 
asserts. Nowadays, surveillance as a disciplinary method is being implemented in prisons via 
cameras, finger prints and alike digital control mechanisms. Under these controlled conditions, 
according to Foucault, prisoners cannot escape from the grid of discipline and the panoptic gaze 
(Foucault 1984). He argues: 
“Prison, as the ultimate “panopticon, “puts inmates in “so many cages, so many small 
theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible” 
(Foucault 1984:19-20).  
The cases I investigate provide evidence for how inmates find ways to escape that web of 
surveillance. These escape methods are also examples of what Goffman calls “secondary 
adjustments”, efforts by inmates to dodge authorities in total institutions, which I will discuss in 
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detail below. For instance, female political prisoners in Mamak Prison between the years 1980 
and 1984 demonstrated how prisoners could escape from the grid of discipline and panoptic 
gaze. One of the former prisoners I spoke with stated that prison guards were to check in each 
ward via a small window in the door. To evade a guard’s gaze, prisoners used their bodies as 
curtains in front of each other when they needed to exchange an item or news to maintain the 
resistance against the military regime in the prisons. 
 Furthermore, former prisoners said that there were unobservable areas of the ward, such as 
the cooking area, where they could perform illicit acts such as rehearsing for a small play in the 
ward or waxing. Goffman refers to such spaces as “free spaces.” In addition to illustrating the 
limitations of complete surveillance in the prison, these acts of female political prisoners show us 
how inmates worked to preserve control over the use of the space and their bodies. 
3.1.3 Productive Power and Resistance 
Foucault (1975) depicts power also as productive, positive and educative rather than solely being 
repressive one that cannot easily be diffused. In his analysis, the subject might be active in the 
process of self-formation but acts according to the operation of particular disciplines, which 
forge a docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved (p.17). According to 
him, this is replicated in general society by what Foucault calls the “microphysics of power,” a 
process whereby we become our own regulators.  
 Foucault’s theories differ from his contemporaries in 1960s-70s. He does not focus on 
power relations solely in political theory or even in the state. In his understanding of power, 
sovereignty or law is secondary. Power is decentralized and everywhere; it is neither a structure 
nor an institution (Foucault 1984). Prior to Foucault’s genealogy of power and subject, 
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discussions on domination had revolved around fixed and institutionalized forms of power. 
Discussions on resistance on the other hand, were about organized opposition to power. 
Although this binary is not abolished from the literature and Foucault does not conceptualize 
resistance in prisons, his novel approach to power as being also productive paves the way for 
further discussions on resistance. In his later works Foucault states his well-known dictum, 
“Where there is power, there is resistance,” but leaves an unconcluded discussion on forms of 
resistance in prisons (Foucault 1993:101). Since, it does not have to be collective or organized 
for an action to count as resistance, I will consider creative actions of the inmates, such as 
communication methods, cooking, singing or dancing as resistance as well. These actions that 
can contribute to one’s subjectivity in desired ways, in contrary to the manipulation by 
disciplinary power, could also provide alternative accounts to overcome the abovementioned 
binary discussion between institutional power and organized resistance. 
My cases as well as O’Hearn’s research on Irish political prisoners (2012) show that power 
alone does not shape prison life, but the dynamic relationship between power and resistance 
does. According to Foucault, power is relational and it is ontologically in coexistence with 
resistance, a thorough examination of the web of relations in daily life of prisoners can help us 
understand that the disciplinary power is not a homogenous, top-down exercise, but rather it is a 
complex map of relations. In this context, rather than solely thinking of resistance as an effect or 
result of the power exercised by authorities, we should see that resistance is reflection of power 
as well as creates power.  
Furthermore, Goffman and Garland reinforce the importance of contextualization of power 
in prisons and help us overcome what is missing in Foucault’s discussions of the capillary power 
in prisons. Garland argues that if Foucault had studied resistance in detail as he had studied 
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power, he would have modified his narrative of the operation of power in prisons as less of an 
‘automatic’ process and more of a matter of micro-political conflict in which the individual 
subject may draw upon alternative sources of power and subjectivity to resist that imposed by the 
institution (Garland 1990:173). However, Garland does not contextualize the power-resistance 
relationship through a concrete case. At this point, Goffman’s ethnography at a mental institution 
and his theoretical explanations on the dynamics of the relations at total institutions are—for the 
purposes of this thesis— more applicable to my analysis of the Mamak and Diyarbakir cases.  
Goffman investigates inmates’ and wardens’ worlds separately in “total institutions” with 
micro-relational lenses (1961). Goffman (1961) defines a total institution as “a place of residence 
and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an 
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administrated round of life” (p.6). 
He acknowledges that total institutions would not be without resistance by stating:  
“Where enthusiasm is expected, there will be apathy; where loyalty is expected there will be 
disaffection; where attendance, absenteeism; where robustness, some kind of illness; where 
deeds are to be done, varieties of inactivity. We find a multitude of homely little histories, 
each in its way a movement of liberty. Whenever worlds are laid on, ‘underlives’ develop” 
(Goffman 1961:305).   
His analysis helps us see that prison sites do not reflect the complex politics of state discipline in 
a form of mere “domination” and “resistance,” nor do they always follow patterns of the 
production of “docile” bodies in Foucauldian terms. Instead, they generate culturally complex 
and politically fraught environments.  
Goffman acknowledges the “total institutions” as contested spaces and suggests that 
inmates create defensive adjustments to the degrading aspects of spatial power (1961). His 
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analysis of the interaction between inmates and staff and with the space unearths how the prison 
order attacks the self and identity via humiliation, mortification and contamination of the self and 
how inmates adapt or find creative ways to resist inside.  
Mortifying aspects of power can either be losing one’s private possessions, individual 
space, changes in personal appearance, or as the most commonly seen forms of mortification in 
Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons: “disruption of the usual relationship between the individual 
actor and his acts” (Goffman 1961:35). Mostly this disruption takes the form of humiliation such 
as: the forced act of deference to call the wardens as “commander”, obligation to humbly ask 
permission to scratch one’s self, to use the bathrooms or to request sanitary pads during female 
inmates’ periods. In addition to mortification of the self, Goffman in his ethnography also 
mentions contamination in total institutions as a way to humiliate inmates (1961). By serving 
unclean food and by failing to regularly clean the wards, floors, common areas, and toilets, 
authorities seek to undermine prisoner morale. The Diyarbakir case has extreme instances of 
physical contamination such as the denial of adequate water to allow prisoners to bathe and drink 
and serving infected food with tuberculosis. Another instance of contamination from Diyarbakir 
and Mamak prisons is the loss of sense of personal safety and physical integrity caused by 
arbitrary beatings and various forms of torture.  
The abovementioned attacks towards one’s use of space and self have humiliating aspects, 
by creating the situation of loss of adulthood, self-determination and autonomy for the inmates. 
Goffman discovered that since the inmates cannot defend themselves by usual means such as 
distancing their selves from the mortifying situation, they employ methods of resisting that 
incapacity (1961). He conceptualizes these methods in total institutions as “secondary 
adjustments” and “underlife” formed by those secondary adjustments. Goffman explains 
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secondary adjustments as “practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to 
obtain forbidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means” (1961:54) 
Secondary adjustments provide the inmate a sense of having control over her environment. I will 
talk more on the examples of secondary adjustments in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons such as 
communicating via tapping on radiator pipes or making a ropeway by undoing their socks and 
using that lift as a tool of transportation and exchanging of goods or news. 
Moreover, resembling James Scott’s concept of “hidden transcripts”, inmates have “free 
spaces” they use in the backstage of the usual performance of staff-inmate relationships 
(Goffman 1961:230). They have their own ways of communication, currency, transportation of 
goods and places to stash contraband. Mamak and Diyarbakir cases both reveal occurrences 
where inmates gave nicknames to threatening situations, items or spaces and made jokes about 
them. Especially, female inmates’ sustained resistant performance in Mamak prison shows how 
ridiculing with humiliating situations reduce the threat they feel.  
When approaching collectivity in total institutions, Goffman introduces another captivating 
concept to help explain the collective rejection of the absolute rule of prison authority in prison 
by “collective teasing”. The concept of collective teasing as a form of secondary adjustment is 
commonly seen in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons, as well. Goffman defines collective teasing as 
rejecting prison staff’s authority, and he gives the examples of slogan shouting, booing, tray 
thumping, mass food rejection and minor sabotage (Goffman 1961:58). With the beneficial 
insights of ethnographic research, he also unravels the effect of inmates’ status and their 
connections outside on the inmate-warden relationship. The effect of inmates’ outside 
connections and failure of expected emotion-control by the staff were especially seen in Mamak 
prison. There are instances of special treatment to the inmates whose relatives were in military or 
26 
who were high-ranked bureaucrats. Wardens who pitied inmates at times offered better 
treatment, and this had impeding effects in front of inmates’ collective action in Mamak Prison. 
Primary adjustments on the other hand, are the ways used by the individuals to cooperate 
and contribute to the standards of the institutions. Goffman helps us more by differentiating the 
secondary adjustments into two: disruptive and contained. Disruptive ones aim for a radical 
change in the structure and contained ones exist within the institutional structure without pushing 
for a radical change. For instance, hunger strikes can count as disruptive ones and learning how 
to speak without moving one’s lips can be counted as contained secondary adjustment. Next, I 
will showcase the implications of these abovementioned theories on the literature of “prison 
riots.” 
3.1.4 Discussions on “Prison Riots” 
Initial studies on inmate movements started during Second World War era with research on the 
war-prisoner camps in Korea, Vietnam, Nazi camps and Soviet labor camps (Pederson 1978). 
Subsequently, most of the researchers focused on American prisons. As previously mentioned, 
the general tendency amongst scholars to develop a social theory for the wider society by 
studying prisons also reveals itself here. Useem and Goldstone (1999) conducted an intriguing 
study where they applied Theda Skocpol’s state-centric theory of revolutions to prison riots. 
They investigated whether state-centric theories of revolution would be supported by the 
dynamics of prison riots, which they also refer to as “micro-revolutions”.  
Functionalist approaches were popular in two main veins: inmate-balance theory and rising 
expectations theory. Sykes argued in favor of the inmate-balance theory, suggesting that riots 
were results of increasing coercion by the officials, which distorted the normally functional 
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social system created by inmates themselves. Basically, this approach suggests “authority cannot 
be taken away from inmates, however skilled the effort, because shared authority is an essential 
element of prison stability” (Useem, and Reisig 1999:755). James Jacobs (1977) on the other 
hand, defends the “rising expectations” approach, claiming that when a more tolerant prison 
order takes the place of a stricter one, inmates’ higher expectations will not be met–and might 
therefore leading to a riot. In another study, Useem and Reisig suggested these two approaches 
are complementary to each other (1999). Furthermore, regarding their study on prison riots as 
micro-revolutions, Useem and Goldstone conclude that riots are more likely to take place during 
transitions or reforms of existing practices—from tight to loose, or loose to tight—and “like all 
historical events [are] subject to the role of contingent events that can shape the outbreak, 
duration, and scope of the event” (1999). While they discuss similarities between revolutions and 
prison riots such as elite dissension, administrative failures and popular grievances, they stress 
the importance of people’s perception of the central authorities’ acts as immoral, ineffective, or 
unjust in understanding the possible causes of a riot (Gurr and Goldstone 1991:331). In another 
critical study, the same scholars discuss that although the social movements theorists reject the 
breakdown theory of collective action, they found evidence to support this theory in a New 
Mexico Prison riot in 1980 (Useem 1985).  
The difference in my case is that the former inmates I interviewed are previously organized 
political prisoners who were already in a politically contentious relationship with the state, 
thereby intensifying state repression in the prison aimed to break their organizational structures. 
Thus, in these high-risk contexts, explaining inmate collective action solely by extreme 
deprivation, inmate-balance, rising expectations or breakdown theories is not feasible. 
Nevertheless, understanding all of these approaches to inmate collective action sheds light on my 
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analysis. This is mostly in part because of some distortion in shared authority, where transition 
processes inside of the prisons are igniter factors for collective action in the cases I investigate, 
too. Now, I will discuss the collective action theories to reach a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for my cases by supplementing the theories on prison riots. 
3.1.5 Discussion on the Dynamics of Collective Action 
Rather than employing one single “grand theory” through this thesis, I instead utilize crucial 
parts of several theories to form a framework within which I analyze the experiences of Turkish 
and Kurdish inmates. I have found that my method of analysis acknowledges the interactions of 
micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors together, rather than insisting merely on the centrality of 
human agency, or—for that matter—even the structural elements to explain the dynamics of 
collective action. To this end, I prefer to utilize a blend of theories rather than forcing my cases 
to fit in a single theoretical approach. Thus, I will briefly discuss the existing collective action 
theories. 
3.1.6 Behavioral Approach 
Until the late 1960s, a psychological causality dominated the discussions around collective 
action, e.g. Strikes, street protests, marches, vigils etc. This perspective suggested that social 
movements are marginalized, unorganized, abrupt crowd reactions fed by grievances or 
deprivations. The commonly used term of “collective behavior” to refer to social movements 
indicated something inferior than a conscious and purposive action. This paradigm has long been 
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criticized for reducing collective action into a sporadic social breakdown or an irrational anomia 
and for marginalizing the participants. 
3.1.7 Rational Choice and a Critical Look 
Later on with Mancur Olson, by the late 1960s and 1970s, rational choice theories paid more 
attention to motivations behind mobilization and rejected centrality of the behavioral theories. 
Rational choice theories explain participation based on methodological individualism. These 
theories also deploy abstract, game-theoretical tools for analysis. Furthermore, such theories put 
forth the claim that rational individuals would not participate in collective action to gain public 
goods. That is unless the group consists of a small number of people, or group members were 
forced to join such a collective. Olson continues to discuss the logic of collective action and 
suggested that collective action depends on selective incentives and perceiving the possible 
personal gain as the outcome (1965). Selective incentives can be positive or negative and if a 
social movement could offer positive incentives for the group, the problem of free riding could 
be overcome. Also, organizational, class-based, race/ethnicity based and gender-based 
ideological differences and conflicting interests together with differing previous life experiences 
of the protestors might precede the value of personal material gains in different historical 
contexts.  
Especially in high-risk collective actions, positive incentives are not solely material or 
individual but are also moral and collective gains (Loveman 1998). Loveman criticizes the 
rational-choice theory for its inapplicability to the high-risk, life threatening, unpredictable 
contexts, such as in military prisons. With a reference to Geddes, Loveman posits that rational 
choice theory can work best where the “rules of game” are predictable (1998). She also reminds 
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us the combination of material or non-material incentives can change over the course of a 
collective action. Therefore, it would be a limited understanding if one only focuses on the 
material incentives at the decision point of recruitment but not through the process. In such 
environments like Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons where the cost of an action can be death, 
torture or any kind of physical and psychological harm and the benefit is the “maintenance of 
honor,” the rational choice theory based on a material calculation will most likely predict 
inaction. Considering political actors’ decisions to act collectively in unpredictable 
environments, as being irrational would be over-simplifying them.  
Instead of conceptualizing actors as having homogenous perceptions and motivations about 
certain situations, I consider the contingent operation of the mixed motivations, backgrounds, 
interactions, and shared identities, in addition to material benefits as motivating the decisions of 
individuals. Discussions in the literature clearly conclude that collective settings operate 
differently from the individualistic models used by Olson and other economists. Still, the self-
interest assumption is a useful heuristic principle, considering inmates’ material grievances and 
potential gains, rather than an explanatory law when explaining collective action in prisons. 
3.1.8 Resource Mobilization Approach 
Resource mobilization theory rebuts collective behavior theories on the grounds that they define 
mobilization processes and collective actions as irrational and unorganized. McCarthy and Zald 
argued that rational individuals could legitimately participate in the normal, rationally organized 
activities of social movements (1977). They suggest that grievances and shared ideologies or 
beliefs always exist in a society. However, to mobilize people requires the availability of the 
material (money, services etc.) and non-material (authority, faith etc.) resources: structural 
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elements like political freedom, networks; along with a means of communication, media and 
alike tools (1977).  
Yet, resource mobilization theories assume the success of a social movement is positively 
correlated with the availability and the richness of the resources mentioned above. This theory 
has been criticized for taking its evidence solely from the American social movements 
experiences, centralizing an entrepreneurial approach to social movements and insisting on the 
need for incentives and/or coercion to foster mobilization (Aslanidis 2012).  More specifically, 
conditioning the assurance of a organizational base to bring people together and because of the 
flexibility of the term “resource”–skills, networks, leadership ability– in addition to the material 
ones, this theory is capable of creating a synergy with micro-level processes of mobilization; 
thus integrating emotions and identity to the collective action. 
3.1.9 Political Opportunity Structure: Threats and Opportunities 
Diverging their foci from both grievances and resources Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Tilly in Dynamics of Contention take a more structural and systematic approach than the 
previous scholars and pay attention to the political and institutional conjunctures in which the 
social movement operates (2004). The political process perspective and political opportunity 
structure neither conceive social movements as irrational spontaneous acts nor as highly 
dependent of resources. The novelty of contentious politics theory is to suggest mechanism-
processes approach to bring a clear methodology in social movements literature.  
Political opportunity structure refers to features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or 
inhibit a political actor’s collective action and to changes in those features (Tarrow and Tilly 
2005). Goldstone and Tilly’s formulation, in the simplest version, suggest a relationship in which 
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as opportunity grows, action mounts and as opportunity shrinks action fades (Aminzade 2001). 
Although, in their later studies, they expand the scope of the theory’s scope by by 
acknowledging that repression can function either way to encourage action or quiescence 
(Aminzade 2001).  
According to Jack Goldstone and Tilly, having access to resources or expecting material 
gains are not sufficient for emergence of a collective action. Instead, they claim defining a 
political opportunity structure is necessary for understanding the challenges towards an 
established political order (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2004). This approach is helpful to better 
embed Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons in the broader political context. Moreover, in Tarrow and 
Tilly’s formulation, political opportunity structure is “external” to potential collective actors, so 
even resource-poor, “weak or disorganized challengers” can benefit from the altering 
opportunities (2005). This is why in environments with material resource deficiency, such as 
prisons, opportunity structure can be utilized to embed the collective action in the structure of the 
prison.  
This latter perception leads us to look at both changing threats and opportunities that occur 
in the political system. Goldstone and Tilly emphasize that threats and opportunities are two 
distinct concepts that can overlap or interact with each other (2004). Moreover, Tarrow suggests 
that an opportunity is not exactly the opposite of a threat, but rather a beneficial change or shift 
in the political system and economic resources between the state and the challengers (1996). 
Furthermore, these authors define threat as “the cost a social group will bear or the level that they 
expect to suffer from inaction.” They break threat into two different categories: “harms that are 
currently experienced or anticipated (current threat), and costs of repression if protest is 
undertaken (repressive threat) (Tarrow 1996:22-41).”   
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However, explaining collective action in high-risk contexts is more complex than assuming 
that collective action would occur when current threats, or the cost of inactions, are perceived as 
greater than repressive threats (the cost of action). In their views, protest usually leads to an 
increase in repression or concession. To explain this, they suggest scrutinizing the interaction 
between opportunities and repressive threats, which gives rise to contention (Aminzade, 2001).  
There might be a correlation between perceiving the opportunities, threats and emergence of a 
protest, but Diyarbakir and Mamak cases show that there is no direct causal relationship.  
Even though Goldstone and Tilly encourage us to realize the interaction between 
opportunity and threats, they still base their theories on insurgents’ decision process to act that is 
a calculation based on the state’s or oppressor’s actions (repression or concession). That is not to 
say that the concepts of opportunity and threat are not explanatory, but at the same time they are 
structurally limited, leading us to miss the rich micro-level dynamics in the formation of 
collective action in prison. However, there are instances–even though inmates acknowledge 
opportunities– in which they cannot mobilize or sustain collective action. To form a collective 
action in high-risk contexts, merely acknowledging threats and opportunities is not enough to 
recruit insurgents. Without the existence of a variety of interpersonal ties, trust in the leaders’ 
willpower in taking risks and channeling emotions like anger, dignity/honor and fear into 
collective identity, overt resistance acts in high-risk contexts would be very rare as Scott also 
suggests (1990). 
At this point we need to orient our attention to the micro-relational aspects of collective 
action. That is to say, we need to consider the micro level factors such as one’s 
perception/framing of self, emotions and meso-level elements such as organizations and 
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networks all together embedded in the opportunity-threat structure to see why collective action 
processes were different in Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons. 
3.1.10 Moving to Micro-Level Explanations: Cultural and Emotional Theory of Action 
Abovementioned theories have overlooked the micro-level interactional dimensions for a long 
time and dominated the discussion on social movements. Until the 1990s, when feminist and 
constructivist scholars started investigating social movements, cultural processes and micro-level 
interactions in social movements analysis were limited to rational choice theory, in which 
individuals were treated as acting solely around individual materialist aims. James Jasper 
criticizes this approach by stating that even if individuals always do what is best for them, we 
need to look into interpretive and emotional dynamics that shape their decisions (Jasper 2010). 
3.1.11 Emotions and Collective Action 
In parallel with Rachel Einwohner’s (2003) work on Warsaw ghetto uprising, this study also 
supports the idea that collective action does not always need an opportunity and not every 
opportunity turns into action. With reference to Roger Gould’s emphasis on the motivating role 
of emotions, Tarrow also recognizes that emotions like grief, anger, and pride turn into resources 
in converting passivity into action (1993). Even though Jeff Goodwin’s study shows that 
affective ties have the possibility to act as barrier in front of collective action, Jasper passionately 
introduces emotions into the field of social movement theories.  
Drawing upon my fieldwork, I take how people feel about themselves, the political 
situation and the options into account as components of interpretation before and during action. 
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If we turn to amalgamate emotions with political process theory, as Jasper carefully does: 
“Opening political opportunity might generate emotions like hope and pride or might legitimize 
emotions like anger and indignation, which in turn might inspire an emotionally resonant 
collective action frame or a reallocation of resources toward collective action” (2004:163) In his 
paradigm, attention to emotions might help us understand why and how opening political 
opportunities sometimes facilitate protests. (Goodwin and Jasper 2004) For example, moral 
shocks both of unexpected and outrageous outcomes, link emotions such as anger, indignation, 
self-respect and grief to confrontational action. According to Goodwin et al. (2007) different 
kinds of emotions are tied to different aspects of resistance. For instance, especially feelings of 
respect and trust are important for this analysis because they enable effective leadership and 
solidarity.  
3.1.12 Networks and Relations 
Meanwhile, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly also argue that collective action emerges from 
interrelations between different subjects and the intersections of their perceptions of reality 
(2004). Additionally, McAdam underlines that assuming individuals, as isolated beings, detached 
from their context when making cost-benefit analysis would be misleading (1986). He buttresses 
the role of interpersonal relations and social networks (eg. friends, family, co-workers etc.) in the 
decision making process of individuals. Particularly, if we consider inmates’ dependence on each 
other to survive in prison, it would be unrealistic to assume that each inmate would solely decide 
according to their individual utility. For example, one’s personal wrong doing in a ward ends in 
punishment for all and one’s informal cooperation with the officers against her comrades makes 
her an untrusted person, which would lead to isolation. 
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Furthermore, individuals are embedded in multiple ties and some of those ties can be 
constraining as well. McAdam’s emphasis on history of activism before, namely biography, also 
makes sense for the political prisoners. I have evidence to support that how previous experience 
of activism; biography and relations were crucial in formation of collective action in the prisons. 
Interpersonal ties and constraining aspects of them indicate that already knowing someone in a 
movement does not lead to higher recruitment rates to the movement. Dimensions of the ties, 
their salience, centrality etc. should also be considered. 
However, Jasper finds this effort of including individual level factors into social movement 
studies still carry their structural bias. This is because the concepts of networks and ties also 
assume an established structure of relations. Looking into interactions that shape those ties would 
be more informative. He suggests that rather than going from macro to micro, instead go in the 
reverse direction, e.g. interpersonal interactions to relations and then ties and networks. This 
would provide us with a richer and more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at an 
individual-level of collective action (Jasper 1997). In a similar vein, Jocelyn Viterna (2013) 
unearths the recruitment strategies of FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) and 
motivations behind individual decisions of women guerillas by introducing the centrality of 
identity. According to her, the salience of identity has appeared to have a major prominence in 
mobilization processes. Further discussion will be on showing how movements can create 
opportunities for recruitment and how threats in the political contexts have the potential of 
increasing or decreasing the number of potential participants by reshaping the meanings of 
identities and the memberships of networks. 
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3.1.13 Leadership and Identity 
Especially in undemocratic and high-risk contexts, leaders can be very influential in fostering 
collective action. In particular, my case shows that the will and determination in taking risks by 
the leaders helps inspire and motivate political prisoners to take collective action. Resembling 
Weber’s distinction of bureaucratic and prophetic leaders, Ron Aminzade also distinguishes 
leaders into “task-oriented” and “people-oriented.” Task-oriented leadership functions to get 
things done, while people-oriented leadership evokes emotions and helps “reshape followers’ 
framing” of the situations, motivating them to take action (2001). As the cases of Mamak and 
Diyarbakir also showcase—most especially in repressive contexts—that it is not sufficient for 
leaders to just get things done; but rather, they must also inspire participation in the collective. 
Similarly, William Gamson stresses the importance of leadership abilities in helping focus and 
sustain activists’ motivation (1991). Denis O’Hearn similarly shows that a leader’s devotion of 
her interests and desires to the collective encourages others (2012). In this study, I will 
demonstrate these distinct conceptualizations of task- vs. people-oriented leadership when I 
delve into details regarding recruitment processes in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons.  
Additionally, Bob and Nepstad hypothesize that, besides a movement’s political 
opportunity structure, the type of leader, the movement’s ideology of martyrdom, the leader’s 
embodiment of a shared group identity, and the movement’s pre-existing unity matters 
significantly to the collective (2007). Although they focus on the impact of assassination of a 
leader on the movement, their perceptions of external and internal factors that shape a movement 
emphasizes micro-level mobilization factors once again. I also think that many studies 
oversimplify the difference between leaders and followers, and the roles of many informal 
leaders of a movement. The cases of Mamak and Diyarbakir showed me that regardless of the 
38 
source of the leaders’ reputation, trust in their knowledge and risk-liability determines the weight 
of their influence in the mobilization process.  
Effective leaders are able to build a sense of collective identity among participants in an 
organization or movement. Francesca Polletta and Jasper define collective identity as “an 
individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, 
practice, or institution.” Prior bonds and organizational affiliations facilitate the formation of a 
shared identity among the people (2001:285). Furthermore, a well-defined and shared 
understanding of “us” vs. “them” is an essential precondition of successful mobilization 
(Gamson 1992). Thus, when a clearly identified enemy exercises coercion to humiliate and 
degrade the opponent, such a situation would ignite a group’s tactics to combat that humiliation 
and forge a shared identity against it. Here, Gould and Craig Calhoun’s work deciphers how 
individual and collective interests, identities, and solidarity are conceived, constructed, 
maintained, and reproduced in the process of struggle itself. Calhoun states, “Identity is, in many 
cases, forged in and out of struggle, including participation in social movements” (1991:52).  
Thus, the relationship between collective identity and action is reciprocal and reproduces itself 
with the changing dynamics of the process. 
3.1.14 Repression and Collective Action 
Since I frame this thesis both in terms of the dynamics of collective action under repressive 
conditions and also in terms of the variations in how successful that repression, I have reviewed 
the literature that speaks when and how the state repression effectively demobilizes movement 
activists. Repression can cause ordinary movement participants to drop out, fearing the costs and 
risks involved (McAdam 1988). It can also create a sense of hopelessness and resignation. 
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Finally, repression may also destroy unity by creating informers, as activists suspect one another 
of being collaborators with the oppressor (Churchill and Vander Wall 1988). As my cases show, 
it can also turn into opportunity bedrock for developing solidary relations required to mobilize. 
On the other hand, Mark Lichbach and Mara Loveman argue that repression facilitates 
collective action. Keeping all the different approaches in mind, the cases I investigate provided 
me evidence to support the claim that, even though repression might cause demobilization and 
depression or hopelessness among the inmates at a time through the process, it also opens space 
for alternative interactions, sharing and trust to develop and if the leaders play perceptive role, 
followers could re-frame their situation and mobilize. That is to say, increasing threats for a 
movement has the potential to turn into an opportunity if the dynamics at micro-level interactions 
could be channeled into action. 
Therefore, my cases support O’Hearn’s analysis of Irish “blanketman protest” by the IRA 
members in late 1970s. According to O’Hearn, “Mortification can clear the way for collectivism 
and solidarity” (2012:461-526).  In addition to these, Stathis Kalyvas has more to argue on 
repression by distinguishing into selective and indiscriminative violence in irregular contentious 
environments. He mainly examines civil wars, but his differentiation of the use of selective and 
indiscriminate violence is also helpful for understanding prison contexts. Kalyvas argues that 
indiscriminate violence occurs when precise information is scarce or selection criteria are rough 
when deciding whom to attack (2006). Although this was not the case in a prison environment 
where the authorities have full information about the prisoners, his third argument about the “use 
of indiscriminate violence to control a population, shape the behavior rather than simply to loot, 
displace, or eliminate” is explanatory (Kalyvas 2006). Obviously the Turkish state conceived of 
the Kurdish liberation movement as a bigger threat than the Turkish socialist movement; and 
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thus, used indiscriminate violence against Kurdish political prisoners while imposing more 
targeted but less severe violence against Turkish political prisoners in Mamak Prison.  
Kalyvas conclude that indiscriminate violence seems to be counter- productive, “with the 
exception of situations where there is a high imbalance of power” (2009:171). He contributes to 
our understanding of collective action in high-risk contexts by arguing indiscriminate violence 
creates an environment where compliance is almost as unsafe as non- compliance. In such an 
environment, the “innocent” can do little or nothing to escape punishment and the “guilty” are no 
more (and sometimes less) threatened” (Kalyvas 2009:154). This argument reflects in Diyarbakir 
case. For instance, the nascent activists who were not involved in political violence acts or the 
relatives of the insurgents who were also confined did not receive a milder treatment than the 
leaders. He further adds that selective violence is effective in enabling deterrence because “ the 
effectiveness of selective violence hinges less on pinpoint accuracy and more on a perception 
among the population that a process of selection is taking place” (p.150). This distinction 
between indiscriminate and selective violence is important because we witness the different 
outcomes that they lead to e.g. indiscriminate violence in Diyarbakir Prison and selective 
violence in Mamak Prison. 
In this chapter I first presented the core justifications of incarceration in penology and the 
theories on modern prisons that I found helpful in framing my case. I approach prisons as 
contested spaces shaped by the relationship between power, compliance, resistance, violence and 
solidarity between prisoners and the prison officials as well as the prisoners themselves. Foucault 
and Goffman’s theoretical discussions primarily informed this framing for my study. I most 
especially find Goffman’s concepts such as “underlife”, “primary adjustments”, “secondary 
adjustments”, and “collective teasing” very significant as I reflect on how these concepts help me 
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explain the patterns I discovered in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. Furthermore, I briefly 
reviewed the literature on prison riots and find that distortion of the shared authority in transition 
processes in prisons is explanatory for my case, too. Leaving the literature on prisons aside, I 
delved into the existing discussions on how to explain collective action in general. After taking a 
critical look on early theories, I buttressed the importance of the micro-level dynamics in 
explaining collective action in prisons. These are mainly the role of leadership, identity, 
interpersonal relations and the effects of the way and extent repression is imposed on collective 
action. From there, I find the concepts of “selective and indiscriminate” violence compelling to 
frame the difference of the repression in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. In the following 
chapter, I will showcase an empirical description of Turkish prison practices and provide a 
historical account on Turkish prisons to better see the changes come with the military coup in 
1980. 
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4.0  CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
4.1 TURKISH PRISONS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE REPUBLICAN 
HISTORY (1920-1980): CONDITIONS OF PRISONS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1980 
To better understand the experience of political prisoners during the early 1980s, we must relate 
the changes in the organization of prison system before the 1980s. Here, I briefly review the 
changing management methods in the prisons, penal codes and daily prison order in the 
republican era. Financial incapacity, lack of modern prison buildings, and escalating organized 
political opposition appear as main determinants of the state-hand intervention to transform these 
institutions. 
The transformation from traditional understandings of justice to rationalized penal codes–
the birth of “modern” forms of imprisonment–dates back to the introduction of Tanzimat Edict 
(1839)7 during the late Ottoman period. In addition to public executions, physical punishment, 
exile, penal servitude (prangabentlik, kalebentlik, kurek cezasi) and imprisonment in castles, 
islands, dungeons, or the houses of governors or imams8 were widely used under the rule of 
Ottoman Empire (Yildiz 2012). In 1871 the first modern prison building was built with the 
                                                 
7 Starting in the late 18th century with modernization reforms in the military, the legal and tax system and the bureaucracy were already 
significantly reformed in Ottoman Empire. Later on, such “liberal” concepts as equality before law, Ottoman citizenship, property rights and 
security of life were introduced with the Tanzimat Edict (1839).7 Shortly after the declaration of the edict, reforms in crime control institutions 
such as courts, police service, gendarme and prison reforms were also initiated.  
8 The title of the person who leads prayers in a mosque.  
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precise aim of imprisonment in Sultanahmet, Istanbul, where the first Ottoman palace stands 
with the goal of concentrating prison populations near central authorities (Sen 2007). The 
Republic of Turkey inherited the Ottoman prisons when it came to power in 1923, along with the 
financial and governmental incapacity to manage them until the late 20th century. Due to the 
financial deficiency, schools, hospitals, military wards, churches, caravansaries9, and castles 
were utilized as places of incarceration by the early republic (Eren 2014).  
There were nearly 35,000 prisoners in the year 1923 (Sen 2007). The new laws make it 
apparent that the early republicans aimed to “rehabilitate” the inmates to make them utilizable 
individuals to the society in their terms. Unlike deterrence, rehabilitation aims to change and give 
a new form to the prisoners’ attitudes. However, the young republic was not able to create the 
“modern” prison buildings and sufficient trained staff suitable for their aims of rehabilitation, 
which required vocational and physical training for inmates. Similar to the Ottoman prison 
reforms, the reports and narratives of the inmates indicate that these regulations were never 
completely implemented on the ground. The journalist Zekeriya Sertel depicts the Istanbul 
(Sultanahmet) prison in 1930s in these words: “There was a huge atelier in which prisoners 
worked…One day they took us to the ward of heavy imprisonment, a cellar from Byzantines. It 
was a deep dark place without windows and with a heavy smell of moisture and coal. About 500 
inmates were living in that cellar with a slice of bread given by the prison for a day. They were 
smoking weed to accelerate their deaths, they seem to be lost their humanity and turned into 
animals, and they were the residuum of the society (Özturk 2004:127).” 
It would not be wrong to assert that prisons were among the least invested of all state 
institutions in the early republican era. The state did not invest resources in or respond to the 
                                                 
9 Historical inns with large courtyards 
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needs of the inmates in regard to health, hygiene, nutrition or the architectural style.  Moreover, 
lack of security, violence among inmates, lack of hygiene, overcrowding and co-habitation of 
minors with adults were the worst aspects of the early republican prisons. Absence of separate 
prisons for women and children was also a major problem when managing the overcrowding and 
addressing the prisoners with special needs. 
Although the government passed legislation in the 1930s to build new facilities in order to 
address the problem of overcrowding, it wasn’t until the 1950s that new construction of prison 
buildings picked up speed. Between 1929 and 1950, 87 prisons were constructed; but when the 
one party rule of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)10 ended in 1950 and the Democrat Party 
(DP)11 came into power, the number of prisons jumped to 149 only within three and a half years 
of the DP rule (Hur 2009). This escalation in the number of prisons was also a harbinger of the 
new waves of trials. The DP expanded the scope of the penal law by expanding the duration of 
punishments and the definition of crimes. Furthermore, the DP increased the arrests of TKP 
(Communist Party of Turkey) members and followed a harsh opposition policy against CHP and 
the press. As a result, the prison population jumped from 32,250 in 1953 to 46,000 in 1955 
(Ozturk 2004:92). 
                                                 
10 The secular modernist political party established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and ruled the republic for 30 years with one-party government. 
11 The conservative and pro-Islam political party as the opponent of CHP. 
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4.2 POLITICAL PRISONERS OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PRISONS:1920-1960 
 
I briefly depicted the prison system of the early Republic, which—like the Ottoman system that 
preceded it–was characterized by insufficient physical capacity and the inability to meet the 
needs of the prisoners. Yet there was another challenge for the penal system, namely: the 
political opponents of the young Republic regime.  
With the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923–and even before then– opponents of 
the new regime were being arrested. Until the 1960s, the majority of the political prisoners were 
members of the TKP, opponent journalists in Istanbul and opposition military officials, together 
with the former bureaucrats of the Empire. Those former bureaucrats were mostly the members 
of Committee of Union and Progress (Ozturk 2004). The new republic was attacking a variety of 
opponents including Islamists, Kurdish insurgents and members of TKP in its early years. Its 
main methods were arbitrary trials under state of emergency, incarcerations, and executions. 
Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were suppressed with arbitrary trials, executions, and 
massacres (Besikci 2013).  
“Political prisoner” as a legal term was not used at that time by the state authorities. In 
state discourse, these prisoners were generally referred to as communists or anarchists (TKP 
members and other socialists), “rebels” or “bandits” (Kurdish insurgents) or “reactionists” 
(Islamists) up until the 1970s. After the 1970s, the term “terrorist” was coined and used to refer 
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to all political prisoners at an increasing rate.12 On the other hand, wardens, prison officials and 
other inmates used the term “politicals” (siyasiler) to refer to such prisoners within the prison 
environment. 
4.3 INCREASING NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS: 1960-1980 
 
According to Boratav, more people became actively engaged in social and political life after 
1950. With the transition to a multiparty system in 1950, the political parties had to consider the 
needs of the peasants, workers and tradesmen—at least during election times (Boratav 1988) . 
Thus, it is useful to touch upon the DP rule and the 1960 military coup before considering the 
polarization of the social and political realm between the 1960s and 1980s. 
Throughout the 1950s, the DP employed repressive policies against the CHP, the press, 
and the communist opposition, namely the TKP (Boratav 1988). Furthermore, the DP 
government pursued liberal market economy reforms during the first half of the 1950s, which 
was also visible in the 1947 party program of the CHP. Liberalization of imports, relying on 
foreign capital investments and credits, characterized the DP efforts to transition into a liberal 
market economy model. However, these attempts failed due to rising inflation and severe 
devaluation of Turkish Lira in 1958. The pressure of the post-WWII years and the Korean War 
affected foreign markets and foreign trade negatively. Thus, it led to a high level of external debt 
(Boratav 1988).  
                                                 
12 See http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/139818-hapishane-den-cezaevi-ne-turkiye-de-degisen-mahpusluk Analysis of the use of “terrorist” in 
Milliyet gazetesi between 1950-2004 shows the increase in the use of terrorist and decrease in the use of anarchist from 1950s to 2000s for the 
political prisoners. 
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In this context, the DP government strengthened the punitive hand of the state by 
expanding the scope of the penal law, constructing new prisons and pursuing arrests of 
communists and opponent journalists. On the 27th of May 1960, the military intervened in 
parliamentary rule and nearly 500 Democrat Party affiliated politicians including the ministers, 
party members, prime minister, and the head of the state were arrested. Members of the DP were 
confined in the prisons, which they had helped construct. The major trial was held in Yassiada 
and lasted 204 days. In the end, fifteen executions took place—including the Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes—forty-three lifelong sentences, and numerous other sentences were issued 
(Ozturk 2004).  
Law professors appointed by the military prepared the 1961 constitution in which certain 
social and political rights were given more liberty than before. For example, workers gained the 
right to collective bargaining and unionizing, and new institutions were formed to provide checks 
and balances. The new constitution partially protected citizens from the state. As Caglar Keyder 
(1989) also points out, the 1961 constitution opened space for new political actors and for the 
eventual politicization of society. Despite the fact that most history books commemorate the 
1961 constitution as the peak of Turkish democracy, it is important to remember that it was 
introduced by a military coup. It was not liberating for all segments of the society. For example, 
in 1959 fifty Kurdish students and politically active young men were arrested with the accusation 
of conducting Kurdish nationalist propaganda against the Turkish state.13 The president 
suggested they be executed, and framed their activism as a communist threat in order to receive 
                                                 
13 Known as the 49s case. 
48 
financial aid from the United States (Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mucadeleler Ansiklopedisi Cilt.7 
1988).14  
They were, however, not executed but kept in solitary cells for about a year. One of the 
students died in custody because of poor health conditions. Meanwhile, the military coup took 
place, and the National Unity Committee15 arrested 485 Kurdish local and religious notables at a 
camp in Sivas in 1960. They chose fifty-five of the sheiks and aghas from the group and exiled 
them to different western cities of the country. Another outcome of the coup was to turn 
Armenian and Kurdish names of the villages into Turkish and campaign for only speaking 
Turkish in public spaces. 
Until the 1960s, the left-wing was active in the political realm under the name of TKP. In 
1961, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) was established, and it dominated the leftist opposition 
sphere throughout the 1960s. In the 1965 general elections the Justice Party, as a continuation of 
the former DP, came into power, and for the first time six different political parties found seats in 
the parliament including TIP, CHP, New Turkey Party (YTP), which was established as a right-
wing party by the Kurdish elites and other right-wing politicians. The Nation Party (MP) and 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were also right wing.  In 1966 the government released a 
general amnesty law, targeting the remaining DP members. A majority of the prisoners 
considered that law too narrow; soon after it was passed prisoners started protesting it in Ankara, 
Istanbul, and Elazig prisons (Ozturk 2004). 
Towards the end of the 1960s, left-wing Turkish and Kurdish student organizations became 
visible in the street protests and university demonstrations. In the mid-1960s, both Turkish and 
                                                 
14 Framing all political oppositions under “communist threat” was a common strategy of the governments to ask financial and military aid from 
USA until 1990s. 
15 The National Unity Committee (in Turkish, Milli Birlik Komitesi) was a group of military officers, led by General Cemal Gürsel, that staged 
the military coup of 27 May 1960 and subsequently ruled Turkey through 20 November 1961. 
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Kurdish socialists came together under the leadership of the TIP, which unlike most of the 
socialist parties of the era preferred an unarmed parliamentary route towards socialism. As a 
result of their efforts, they gained seats in the 1965 elections (Zurcher 2004). Alongside the TIP, 
the Kurds also organized under the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (TKDP), established 
in 1965, the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts (DDKO), established in 1969, and the 
Democratic Party in Turkish Kurdistan (T-KDP), formed in 1970. TKDP was an illegal Kurdish 
nationalist party. T-KDP was also illegal and had a Marxist framing for the struggle but they 
were both aiming for a free Kurdistan. DDKO on the other hand, resembled a Kurdish student 
organization holding cultural activities during its initial years (Turkmen 2013).  
Unlike the Kurds who preferred to organize under the TIP; the TKDP and T-KDP were 
inspired by the Kurdish armed movement in Iraq and had close connections there. In this vibrant 
environment of the late-1960s, TIP started to lose its place as a unifying party of the left. 
Fractionalizations within the TIP became visible between the Turkish and Kurdish socialists and 
promoters of SD Socialist Revolutionary Argument (SD) and the National Democratic Argument 
(MDD). The supporters of the SD were claiming a parliamentary route to fulfill socialism; 
whereas, supporters of MDD had Turkish nationalistic constituents and suggested a military 
coup with the alliance of the army, intellectuals and bureaucrats before the proletariat 
dictatorship (Akyol 2010). 
Meanwhile, the same fractionalization was taking place among left-wing university student 
organizations. Federation of Thought Clubs (FKF), which later was turned into Revolutionary 
Youth (DEV-GENC) in 1969, was the leading student organization. Student protests targeted the 
capitalist system and U.S. imperialism together with the university students’ issues such as 
illiberal school environment, high fees, and unequal treatment. The most popular of these armed 
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organizations were Turkey People’s Liberation Party/Front (THKP-C), led by Mahir Cayan, 
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), led by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, and the 
Turkey People’s Liberation Army (THKO), led by Deniz Gezmis. These revolutionary student 
organizations were in touch with the Palestinian guerilla camps in Lebanon, and most of them 
visited the camps between 1968 and 1971. Concomitantly, right-wing para-military groups with 
an “anti-communist war” motto were trained by the state in commando camps to fight against the 
flourishing armed revolutionary organizations.   
Along with revolutionary student organizations and political parties, labor unions were also 
polarized. In 1967 Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) was established 
in opposition to the state-led Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) (Ozturk 2004). 
Left-wing students were imprisoned for the first time in 1968.  The years between 1968 and 1971 
passed with increasing number of strikes in mines, factories and farms; numerous invasions of 
universities by the organized students; mass street protests; and violent attacks against U.S. and 
Israeli ambassadors and soldiers. The police and gendarme responded violently to all these 
actions. On March 12, 1971, the military intervened in parliamentary rule for the second time. 
This time their reason was to end “anarchy”16 on the streets and economic downfall. 
                                                 
16 Anarchy here does not refer to anarchism, but rather to the actions of socialists with reference to disrupting existing “order”. 
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4.4  THE PRISON SYSTEM AS AN INSTITUTIONAL WEAPON AGAINST 
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
From the 1960s on, a majority of new prisons were built on a ward-based system until they were 
transformed into the high-security rooms/cells-based prisons of the 2000s. Embedded in the new 
legislation code of the year 1965 was also an article about regulating the daily lives of prisoners. 
Article 122 read: “Wake up, cleaning, physical training, going to school or joining workshops, 
meals, free time and sleep hours schedules were determined according to internal regulations.” 
Point 123 read: “Inmates could not talk during working hours, meal times or at schools. Inmates 
could not talk after the sleeping hour” (Menguc 1968). The new legislation paralleled that of the 
1930s, which sought to treat (rehabilitate) inmates. However, the architectural changes, intense 
security precautions, and strict inner regulations on daily lives of the prisoners were 
manifestations of the shift to a strict regulatory form of disciplinary rule in prisons. Working 
regularly, being subjected to a time schedule, obeying the hierarchy of the prison authority and a 
moral life style were the expected outcomes of this disciplinary rule in prisons. 
Additionally, until the covenant of 1967, political prisoners were not officially classified 
and separated from ordinary prisoners. In 1967, the new covenant categorized the prisoners into 
three groups: 1- First committers of crime, persistent violators, habitual or vocational criminals; 
2- the criminals to be subjected to a special regime because of their mental, physical and age 
situations; 3-Political criminals (Menguc 1968). The covenant enforced the isolation of political 
prisoners from ordinary prisoners and defined the aim of such “treatments” as: “the use of 
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precautions, technics [sic.] and rules to create the willingness to obey the laws and help the 
prisoners adapt to the outside life easily” (Menguc 1968:379-423). It is possible to interpret these 
changes in prison management as the state’s response to escalating revolutionary opposition. 
Throughout the 1970s, following the 1971 coup, an increasing number of Turkish and 
Kurdish left-wing insurgents found themselves imprisoned as political prisoners. Table 1 shows 
the increasing number of prisoners in the 1970s and 80s. The number of total prisoners in Turkey 
increased from 30,000 in the mid-1970s to 79,000 in 1981 
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Table 1: 1970-89 Total number of convicted and detained prisoners. 
Year Convicted Detainee Total 
1970 30.119 26.392 56.511 
1971 33.416 28.047 61.463 
1972 36.14 28.749 64.889 
1973 33.722 27.246 60.968 
1974 5.442 19.418 24.86 
1975 14.276 23.34 37.616 
1976 19.881 24.45 44.331 
1977 22.632 27.752 50.384 
1978 25.232 29.43 54.642 
1979 22.417 30.236 52.653 
1980 31.241 38.931 70.172 
1981 42.446 37.34 79.786 
1982 44.65 33.551 78.201 
1983 45.144 31.114 76.258 
1984 46.37 26.694 73.064 
1985 45.388 25.842 71.23 
1986 30.786 21.364 52.15 
1987 31.315 19.484 50.799 
1988 33.078 18.592 51.67 
1989 29.407 17.697 47.104 
Source: General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/ 
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The 1970 coup suppressed the rising left wing movements in Turkey only for a while. A 
significant number of young people subsequently died in custody and in skirmishes with the 
police and soldiers. Three student leaders were executed, and many others were imprisoned and 
died in custody between 1971 and 1974. The Kizildere Massacre in March of 1972 and then the 
three executions following the massacre just two months later had the greatest effect on the 
revolutionary groups. Maltepe, Mamak, Sagmalcilar and Pasakapisi prisons confined most of the 
revolutionary insurgents until their release with the 1974 general amnesty law. The significant 
drop in the total prison population in 1974— from 60,000 in 1973 to 24, 000 —is largely due to 
the amnesty law.  
Although their leaders had been executed by the state, remaining political members were 
released with the 1974 General Amnesty Law. They subsequently re-formed the revolutionary 
organizations. Especially between 1974 and 1978, Turkish and Kurdish left wing organizations 
established strongholds in working class neighborhoods, factories, trade unions, villages and 
universities. Fractionalizing between the Kurdish and Turkish revolutionary organizations 
continued and speeded up in the second half of the 1970s. Kurdish organizations that were 
founded in the post-1974 era considered Kurdistan as a separate country and a colony, which is 
divided between four nation-states of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey (Turkmen 2013). Thus, they 
re-framed their struggle beyond the 1960s’ idea of that inequality would be overcome by 
collaborating with Turkish revolutionary organizations. Instead, most of the post-1974 Kurdish 
political organizations adopted a strategy of armed struggle to break the Turkish state’s 
colonialism. 
Here are some of the organizations established during the 1970s whose members were 
imprisoned into the 1980s in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. The main active Kurdish 
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revolutionary organizations in the post-1970 era whose members were incarcerated in the 1980s 
were: DDKD and Revolutionary Democratic Women’s Organization (DDKAD), Ozgurluk Yolu 
(Revolutionary Path), Rizgari, Kawa, PKK Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Kurdistan National 
Liberators (KUK). The main active Turkish revolutionary organizations in the post-1974 era 
were: Kurtulus (Salvation), Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path), Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary 
Left), Halkin Yolu (People’s Path), Halkin Kurtulusu (People’s Salvation), Acilciler and 
Turkey’s Worker-Peasant Salvation Army (TIKKO). 
The era between 1974 and 1980 was the most vibrant, polarized, and contentious political 
environment experienced by both right wing and left-wing communities. Besides daily and 
armed skirmishes between right wing and left-wing students and between left-wing students and 
police, the May 1st (1977), Maras (1978) and Corum (1980) massacres ignited political 
contention between left-wing insurgents and the state. The number of mass street protests, 
strikes, factory and university invasions, bank robberies, and armed skirmishes between the 
organizations or police forces escalated. In 1978, a state of emergency was declared to combat 
increasing “anarchy” and “fraternal fighting.” Eventually, in 1980 the military abolished the civil 
government and ruled the country for three years. At the same time, due to the disputes over 
methodology, ideology, and mobilization zones, armed skirmishes and enmities flourished 
among socialist revolutionary organizations, too. Conflicts between the above-mentioned 
organizations will matter for our understanding of the dynamics among inmates in Mamak and 
Diyarbakir prisons between 1980 and 1985.   
The order in the prisons started to change with the 1971 coup. Prison legislation of 1965 
and 1967 introduced a more restrictive rule in prisons. This was further intensified under the 
military rule in 1970s. Following the 1970 military coup, political prisoners were subjected to 
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military discipline (Calislar 2010). Just as if they were in a military ward, their hair had to be 
short as a soldier’s, roll calls were made in the military order, prisoners had to stand still and wait 
for the guards, and they were expected to obey a military hierarchy in the prison. In addition to 
this militarized regime, political prisoners were forced to wear ties. Treatment in the prisons was 
becoming harsher when THKP-C leader Mahir Cayan and four of his friends fled from Istanbul 
Maltepe Prison within the first seven months of the coup. Colonel Nevzat Bolugiray was in 
charge of the prisons during the emergency state of 1978-1980 and the 1980 military coup in 
Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Hatay and Mersin. He presents the situation of 
the 1970s and early 80s prisons in the region: “As the number of arrests increased, especially 
after the Maraş events, overcrowding was the major problem. Desperately we converted dining 
halls and the wards of the soldiers’ into prisons. People were sleeping on top of each other under 
very poor health conditions. Security precautions, on the other hand, were extremely insufficient 
in civilian prisons. People were everywhere, in the corridors, doorways, and toilets everywhere. 
The prisons had the ward system, wards of 80-100 people. If we had the room for a system of 
cells for 3-5 people, we would have obstructed the way of the ideological education sessions of 
political prisoner and their commune systems. Moreover, escapes were the biggest problem. For 
example, a right wing agitator fled and killed someone and returned back to the prison! The 
precautions were so weak that anyone could escape easily. The architecture of the prisons was 
far away from keeping the terror criminals safely (Bolugiray 2001:69-73).”  
In addition to Bolugiray’s observations, Oral Calislar, a former inmate of Mamak Prison, 
depicts the 1970s prison environment in Ankara as a place where they could stay all day in the 
yard, move between the wards, and had access to books and cigarettes (2010:9-11). Despite the 
disciplinary rules and laws that were introduced, the use of time was still under the control of the 
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prisoners in Ankara. Actually, the military coup in 1970 tried to introduce daily regulations into 
the prisons, but only the 1980 military coup could realize it for a while.  
The junta justified the 1980 coup by stating that they had to intervene to restore the social 
and economic order (Birand 1985). It was a common practice in other countries of the world too, 
in late 20th century that state violence interfered when the capitalist order cannot function 
properly and attacked by the organized political opposition (Dilek 2014). Due to the global 
economic recession and rise in oil prices post-1974, the Turkish economy was in depression with 
a more than four million dollar trade deficit in 1977 (Boratav 2003). High inflation rates and 
repetitive devaluations were not satisfying the IMF’s economic restoration policies for Turkey. 
Moreover, increasing strikes and strong labor unions were seen as management problems for the 
employers. In addition to crushing organized labor, students and Kurdish insurgents, the 1980 
military coup also functioned as a transitory means to introduce a neo-liberal economy model by 
collaborating with the leading owners of capital. 
Since the military promised to pursue the economic “stabilization policies” of January 
24th, local capitalists and inter-state organizations such as NATO, the IMF and the World Bank 
were in favor of the 1980 coup d’état (Mavioglu 2006). Despite these financial constraints, the 
military built new prisons, increasing their capacity from 55,000 to 80,000. The construction of 
Metris and Diyarbakır prisons were accelerated to be ready for confining the insurgents during 
the 1980 military coup, however Metris opened seven months later than the declaration of the 
coup (Kukul 1998). The Martial Law Command of Istanbul announced that the slowing down of 
work constituted a crime. After having adopted the most restrictive constitution of Turkey via 
referenda on October 10 1982, most of the social and political rights were suspended. Seniority 
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compensation rights of workers, membership in labor unions, and rights to collective bargaining 
and strike were limited (Birand 1999). 
Military rule formally ended on November 6, 1983 but in practice it lasted until the end of 
the 1980s. Civil elections were held on November 6, 1983, consisting of candidates approved by 
the military council, National Security Council (MGK). Martial law ended in Ankara in July of 
1985 and in Diyarbakir in July 1987. The Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons were actively used to 
imprison political prisoners in this era, specifically between 1980 and 1985.  
As novel practices of discipline in Turkish prisons, military prisons of 1980s operated to 
transform prisoners into soldiers, meaning they were subjected to harsh military discipline and 
treated as if they were the lowest-ranked soldiers. The disciplinary program imposed on these 
prisons was strict and violent in comparison to a previously loosely controlled prison system. 
Mehdi Zana in his memoirs from Diyarbakir Prison writes: “According to the decision made by 
Military Court of Cassation in 1975, general and political prisoners could be treated as soldiers 
before the military courts. Prescription of Military Penal and Detention houses’ section for ‘rules 
for prisoners to obey’ declared: ‘Soldier convicts should not forget that they are soldiers and 
civilians should not forget that they are soldiers before the military judiciary’” (Zana 2004).  
Such episodic evidence reveals how procedures of punishment were evolving into a barrack-style 
mode of military discipline in prison. State authorities were carrying the rule of military barracks 
into wards by strict daily programs. 
Torture and strict regulation of the daily schedules were dominant in prisons, especially in 
Diyarbakir, Mamak and Metris. Educational hours centered on Ataturk’s edicts and religion. 
Prisoners were forced to memorize the military anthems and selected words of Ataturk. If they 
broke prison the rules, they were beaten, or worse, faced torture. Another prominent application 
59 
of military rule in prisons was mandatory uniforms. Resistance against uniforms, torture, military 
discipline, and the top-down imposition of a homogenous subjectivity grew among political 
prisoners. Prisoners relied on the communal life and other forms of resistance to survive under 
the military regime. The communes in wards improved both the psychological and physical 
health of the prisoners by fostering solidarity and flashed of organized movements against prison 
authority. 
Chanting slogans, rejecting meals, refusing to stand up when a guardian came around, 
refusing to wear the uniform, and boycotting the canteen meals were some of the everyday forms 
of resistance practiced by the detainees. Above all, however, the most effective and publicly 
prominent forms of protest were hunger strikes and acts self-immolation. Among Metris, 
Mamak, and Diyarbakir prisons, conditions in Diyarbakir Prison, where the Kurdish insurgents 
were detained, were the harshest. Also, the most extreme cases of torture were reported there. To 
have a more comprehensive understanding about the significance of the Kurdish identity in a 
Turkish military prison, we need to grasp the history of the Kurdish question in Turkey, and I 
provide a brief description of that history below. 
4.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY 
Historically, the root of the modern Kurdish conflict can be traced to 19th century Ottoman 
Empire’s modernization era. The Ottoman Empire took control of Kurdistan17 in the 16th century 
(Besikci 2013). Until the beginning of the 19th century, Kurdish tribes had local autonomous 
                                                 
17 Geographically the area where the Kurdish speaking population had lived for centuries in southeastern region of modern Turkey, northern 
regions of modern Iraq and Syria and  northwestern region of modern Iran. 
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governments where they regulated their religion, local security, education, trade, judiciary courts 
and so on. The relation between the Empire and the Kurdish tribes depended on a military 
agreement in which Kurds provided warriors to the Empire during wartimes and protected the 
Empire’s borders with Safavid (modern Iran) Empire (Bruinessen 2000). The Empire’s efforts to 
centralize governance and introduce tax reforms in the beginning of the 19th century ignited the 
conflict between autonomous Kurdish governments and the Sultanate. The resistance of Kurdish 
tribes against state centralization and loss of their autonomy created the perception of Kurds as 
obstacles to Turkish modernization (Yegen 2007).  Between 1803 and 1912, Kurdish tribes 
rioted twelve times and fought with Sultan’s central armies. During this era of armed conflict in 
19th century, Turkish nationalism was flourishing in the Balkans. Furthermore, the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913) was the determinative point where Muslimhood conjoins Turkish nationalism, with 
the loss of vast territory and most of the non-Muslim population, the idea of homogenization of 
the population occurred (Yegen 2007). The traumatizing consequences of the Balkan Wars with 
the loss of Balkan territories made Turkish modernists abandon Ottomanism18 and conceive a 
nation-state without non-Muslims, as only way to escape from the past.  
The First World War and the Turkish Independence War followed the Balkan wars. As a 
result of all these wars, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned, invaded by the Allied forces, and 
the territory shrank to Anatolia. The modern Turkish Republic declared independence in 1923 on 
the territory of Anatolia and a small portion of Thracia. In the following years between 1920 and 
1938, different Kurdish tribes rioted nineteen times (Bruinessen 2000). After 1925, the future 
trajectory of Turkish nationalism added “Turkification” to the “Muslimification” of Anatolia. Of 
the two major non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia, a majority of the Armenians faced the genocide 
                                                 
18 The idea of pulling different ethnic and religious groups together under the Ottoman citizenship. 
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and forced migration, and a majority of the Greeks were exchanged with the Turks of Greece. 
Kurds on the other hand were considered as future Turks, since a majority of the Kurdish 
population was also Sunni-Muslims.19 In a way, Turkishness was a status that Kurds could 
acquire if they went through a successful assimilation (Yegen 2007). 
In other words, Turkish nationalism was open to Muslim peoples of the Empire, which 
were seen as potentially assimilated Turks, but it was closed to the non-Muslim populations 
(Yegen 2007). After 1925, the Turkish government denied the existence of Kurds as a separate 
ethnic group. Speaking Kurdish was banned, all information regarding Kurdistan erased from the 
history textbooks, and the remaining Kurdish and Armenian names of the villages, streets, and 
regions were given Turkish names–anything was done in order to obscure and separate Kurdish 
identity and history. “Scientists” inspired by the Italian and German fascism in 1930s, were 
measuring skulls and trying to prove that Kurds were genetically inferior to Turks, that their 
language was a distorted version of Farsi, and that they were primitive mountain savages, 
uncivilized bandits who had to be educated and assimilated into Turkishness (Yegen 2007). 
Kurds were thus allowed basic citizenship rights as long as they assimilated. Stemming from this 
historical ethnic discrimination, educated Kurdish youth had started to get politically organized 
in 1950s, and by the 1970s there were large number of Kurdish revolutionary liberation 
organizations. Most of these groups used political violence and guerilla fighting to resist the 
Turkish state. 
Yegen’s analysis shows the shift in Turkish nationalism’s perception of the Kurdish 
question coinciding with changing power constellations, the first half of the 20th century saw a 
rivalry between backward tribal sheikhs, pre-moderns and a modern, prosper Turkish army and 
                                                 
19 The Alewite and Yezidi population of Kurds were seen religiously heretical in the eyes of the Turkish authorities; they were also killed or 
deported. 
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government. By the 1950s and 60s, communist mobilizations polarized the society.  In the 1970s, 
the rise of Turkish nationalism led to the portrayal of the Kurdish national liberation movement 
as a product of a global communist movement. Thus, the Kurdish question was turned into a 
security and democratization problem by the 1980s and 1990s due to the changes in the global 
political realm (Yegen 2007).   
Similarly, Gunes shows the transformation of Kurdish movement since 1960s from the 
bases of social inequality and lack of economic development to discourse of colonization of 
Kurdistan by four nation-states and a need for socialist revolution in 1970s. Again, the belief in 
the need for a socialist revolution left itself to armed struggle for national liberation during 80s 
and human rights discourse from late 90s onwards (2011). We can see how Turkish nationalism 
and Kurdish movement transformed through similar paths. Of course this similarity is not only 
based on their contingency and reciprocal relationship, but also the influence of international 
conditions such as the Gulf War, Cold War, the pressure of international press and the EU 
membership process, which contributed to a rise in human rights discourse. In the following 
chapter, I will show how, in the case of Diyarbakir prison the use of state repression and prisons 
to dissolve social movement organizations continued the Turkish state’s assimilation policies 
towards the Kurds. In line with this historical fight against Kurdish identity and organized 
movement, Kurdish identity holds a salient position as a reason for imposing indiscriminate 
violence in Diyarbakir Prison. 
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5.0  CHAPTER III: INSIDE THE MAMAK AND DIYARBAKIR PRISONS 
5.1 MAMAK MILITARY PRISON 
 
Mamak Military Prison was built in the Mamak district of the capital city, Ankara, at the city’s 
outskirts, downhill of the Huseyingazi Mountain. It is located inside the 28th Division of the 4th 
Army Corps. It continues to be a military prison. Mamak was infamous amongst the Turkish 
revolutionaries because, during the 1971 coup, student movement leaders Deniz Gemis, Huseyin 
Inan and Yusuf Aslan stayed there prior to being sentenced to death by the military junta of the 
1971 coup. In 1970s the entire prison was composed of only one building to confine convicted 
soldiers, two big and two small wards, and two solitary confinement cells. Subsequently, one 
building became Block-B and new blocks were added (A, C and D blocks) before the 1980 
military coup. In addition to the cells, the infamous Colonel of Mamak Prison, Raci Tetik, built 
special solitary confinement spaces, which he called tabutluk (coffins). Tabutluks were dark, 
vertical rectangular prisms of 1x1 square meters, where one could either sit or stand. The space 
was not enough to lie down or move around. Another architectural feature that is specific to 
Mamak was the kafes (cages). Cages were modeled after the lion cages, and were built to keep 
prisoners in for a few days before sending them to their wards. 
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Figure 1: Tabutluk (coffin) 
 
Source: http://www.mimarlarodasiankara.org/mamak/index.php-Did=7.htm 
After the 1974 general amnesty of political prisoners, left-wing political organizations 
dispersed into separate, smaller organizations following different revolutionary leaders of 1960s 
and 70s. The Mamak military prison housed nearly 31,000 prisoners between 1980 and 1985. 
The yearly population increased to 3500 inmates, at times housing a maximum of 200 female 
inmates. A majority of the inmates were members and sympathizers of Revolutionary Path (Dev-
Yol). Dev-Yol had the highest number of sympathizers and members within universities and 
working-class neighborhoods. Its protests attracted the largest crowd, and its organization 
extended into the central Anatolia Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. Members of Halkin 
Kurtulusu (People’s Salvation) comprised the second largest population of inmates in the Mamak 
Prison. The remaining political prisoners were scattered in smaller numbers, and they were 
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members of TKP, Kurtulus, Halkin Yolu, Dev-Savas, Acilciler, TIKKO, Partizan, TIKB, 
Aydinlik, TKP/ML and Devrim Yolu. In addition to these left-wing political organizations, there 
were members of the right-wing political organizations as well. They were the sympathizers or 
members of MHP, MSP, Grey Wolves and Turkish Revenge Brigade. However, they were 
smaller in numbers in comparison to the political prisoners associated with left-wing 
organizations. An important element of Mamak constituted placing right wing and left-wing 
political prisoners in the same wards and cells under the policy of “karistir baristir”   (mix and 
reconcile).  
Common types of political actions of the above mentioned organizations were pirate 
demonstrations, meetings, organizing and informing the people living in poor neighborhoods and 
new students in universities. Other political actions included posting revolutionary banners and 
painting walls with slogans, bank robberies to fund their organizations, issuing periodicals, 
distributing fliers, and holding informative political theory meetings in student houses or 
university halls. Armed skirmishes between the left and right wing political organizations as well 
as with the police were very common. A few of those organizations formed guerilla squads, but 
could not sustain or grow like the PKK did.  
           The interrogation of the inmates took place at the police station, known as Deep 
Inspections Laboratory (DAL). Every interrogated insurgent was subjected to torture, electric 
shocks, “Palestinian hangings” (hanging by the arms) and beating. Sexual harassment and rapes 
of prisoners at the police station were also common before they were taken to Mamak. Mamak 
was infamous for the cages Colonel Raci Tetik constructed during his reign at the prison. The 
cages were used to welcome the newcomers with torture. Every prisoner was beaten in this cage 
and kept for a few days before being assigned to the wards. Torture, in the form of regular 
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beatings with a truncheon, excessive exercise in extreme temperatures and verbal humiliations, 
dominated prison life in Mamak. Although the level of violence never intensified as it did in 
Diyarbakir prison, it was a daily routine. Other forms of repression included the banning of 
family visiting hours, attorney visits, and free yard hours. Similarly, mandatory education and 
training sessions, as depicted in previous chapters, were introduced in Mamak prison too. A male 
informant Mehmet from Mamak depicts the cage: “When I saw the cages, I immediately 
remembered the books I read on Vietnamese resistance in Saigon prison. There were also cages, 
the only missing thing were two lions!” Another male informant Metin goes on: “After staying 
seventy days at DAL and suffering from torture, we were dreaming of a comfy ward, but what we 
got was a cage! Literally a lion cage with fences in the middle of the prison yard! They kept us in 
the cage for three days constantly humiliating before scattering us to the wards.”  
The cages in Mamak Prison are typical examples of mortification of self in Goffman’s 
description of total institutions. Since this kind of cages were made for keeping animals, soldiers 
were degrading inmates’ status by keeping them in the cages like animals, stripping them off 
from their belongings and privacy. 
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Figure 2: Kafes (cage) 
 
Source: Kaktusler Susuz da Yasar 
By July 1980, prior to the coup, the infamous colonel of Mamak Prison was assigned. As 
nearly all interviewees stated, military rule in Mamak prison started on August 28, 1980, about 
fifteen days before the actual declaration date of the coup on the September 12th. On August 
28th, 1980, a preliminary decree on the military coup was posted to the Generals asking them to 
be ready for action at any moment. On the very same day, a special team of soldiers brutally 
attacked the prisoners in Mamak Prison. This was the first operation conducted in the prisons to 
mark the military coup. A male Informant Kemal says: “Special commandos from Bolu came for 
that operation. They didn’t stop beating us and shooting at the sky and our wards until the 
morning.” All the male and female inmates were severely beaten and threatened between 28th of 
August 1980 and 11th of September 1980. During these thirteen days, one inmate died due to 
torture, many of them were injured and soldiers managed to impose the military order in the 
Mamak prison.  
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According to the new rules, inmates must salute the wardens as “commander,” and they 
should shout and give an oral report and headcount to the soldiers. When they did not shout loud 
enough they would be beaten up. Moreover, inmates had to wake up at 6am, shave, and start 
physical education every hour for 45 minutes followed by a 15 minute break and then start 
normative education, memorizing Ataturk’s life and edicts in Nutuk for 45 minutes (Yıldız 
2001). Education sessions consisted of forced reading of a book on Ataturk, memorizing sixty 
military anthems, the Turkish national anthem and national oath, and praying before meal times. 
The daily schedule of prison life in Mamak was the same with Diyarbakir Prison. The only 
difference was that the military imposed the rules a week before the coup in Mamak and they 
were ended sooner. Calislar depicts the era of the 1980 coup as a “new system,” where the 
inmates lost their control over how to spend time inside. He states that before the coup, ward 
doors were open all the time. Prisoners could freely visit other wards during 1970s, however 
conditions became stricter with the 1980 coup (2010). With this new system, spaces gained new 
meanings. Yards became spaces for military education and torture; wards became spaces where 
prisoners’ interactions with others were watched and punished. Tabutluks were the ultimate 
space of incarceration. Nevertheless, inmates created free spaces in the wards and utilize yard 
hours to communicate. 
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Figure 3: Physical education hour in Mamak Prison 
 
Source: http://www.mimarlarodasiankara.org/mamak/index.php-Did=7.htm 
 
5.2 DIYARBAKIR PRISON 
 
Diyarbakir Prison is located in the Baglar district of the city of Diyarbakir, one of the biggest 
hubs in southeast Turkey.20 Currently, it is not in use; instead, a new high-security prison was 
built. There is an ongoing discussion between former inmates, their relatives, human rights 
associations/activists, political parties, and the government to decide the future of the old 
building. Human rights activists demand that the prison building be turned into a museum of 
                                                 
20 Northern Kurdistan 
70 
memory, resistance and torture. The government on the other hand, wants to either demolish or 
turn it into a school or hotel.  
In 1980s, an urban area like it is today did not surround the prison; it is located on the 
west-end of the city. Architecturally, it was built as a “type-E” prison, which consists of five 
parallel blocks with shared yards, resembling the letter “E.” Including the administration 
building; it consisted of five blocks in total. Former inmates point out that at the time of their 
transfer to the prison, its construction was incomplete.  
The structural maximum capacity of the prison was between 600 and 900. However, 
informants report overcrowding, more than a thousand inmates at times. Based on these 
accounts, more than 20,000 people were housed in Diyarbakir Prison between 1980 and 1985 
(Bulut 2003). The population of Diyarbakir prison was predominantly Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) members. PKK had 591 defendants at the main trial. There were also members of the 
following Kurdish organizations: Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), 
Ozgurluk Yolu (Liberation Path), Kurdistan National Liberators (KUK), Rizgarî (Salvation), Ala 
Rizgarî (Flag of the Salvation) and Kawa. Additionally, there were also members of smaller 
Turkish revolutionary organizations: TKP, Dev-Yol, and TIKKO.  
Before entering the prison, each inmate was interrogated in the 7th Army Corps campus, 
which was named as “Kurdoglu” (equivalent of DAL in Ankara). One of the first measures after 
the 1980 coup d'état was to extend the maximum period of detention from 15 to 30, and then to 
90 days. Not all of the inmates were held there for 90 days, but most of them were kept more 
than 30 days. Nearly all informants were taken there, handcuffed and blindfolded. They 
experienced severe beatings, electric shock, rape, and threats that their children or spouses would 
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be raped, and Palestinian hangings, beating with baton, starvation and dehydration. Their nails 
were pulled off and cigarettes were put off on their backs and sexual organs.  
Inmates were forced to admit to the crimes the prosecutors assigned to them and to share 
information about their comrades. After the interrogation process, they were transferred to the 
Diyarbakir military prison. The beating and interrogation continued upon entering the prison as 
well. The first thing a female prisoner, Aliye, remembers about the prison is: “I remember iron 
doors shutting and making terrible noises. The giant one of the guards asked me if I wanted to 
stay in a room with a TV or bath. I was surprised. Then they took me to a cell full of sewage 
water rising up till my belly. They kept me there for one week, beating me in that pool of sewage 
every day before sending me to the ward.” The treatment inmates received upon entering the 
prison is significant in the way that it depicts how the insurgents were already subject to 
violence, exhausted and passivized prior to and during their enterence to the prison. Thus, they 
came into prisons already aware of the risks of resisting state repression.  
 In Diyarbakir prison, between 1980 and 1984, fifty-two insurgents were killed; twelve 
were disabled due to severity of torture and 108 of them caught tuberculosis (Tekin 2012:40-54). 
During Colonel Esat Oktay’s tenure in the Diyarbakir prison (1981-1983), it was considered 
among the ten most notorious jails in the world.21 Severe and systematic beating, being stripped 
naked, the obligation to salute Captain Esat Oktay Yıldıran’s dog, water and food deprivation, 
“falaka” (beating of the soles of feet), Palestinian hangings, excessive exercise in extreme 
temperatures, stretching, squeezing or crushing of limbs and genitalia, piling of naked prisoners 
on top of each other, asphyxia and mock execution, electric shocks (specifically electrodes 
attached to genitals), extraction of nails and healthy teeth, forcing prisoners to mix with prisoners 
                                                 
21 http://www.criminaljusticedegreehub.com/top-10-most-violent-prisons-in-the-world/ 
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with tuberculosis, sexual humiliation and assault, rectal examinations, forcing prisoners to 
beat/sexually humiliate/rape or urinate on each other, rape or threat of rape of prisoners, or 
relatives of prisoners in their presence by prison guards, violent forcing of truncheon rectally, 
forced feeding of rotten/contaminated food or feces, baths in prison sewers (referred to as “the 
disco” by the guards) (Zeydanlioglu 2009) were the most common methods of torture during 
Esat Oktay’s reign. In brief, systemic mortification of self (identity), sexual molestation and 
physical pain dominated the domain of prisoners’ lives. The extent of violence never reached to 
this level in Mamak Prison. There were political and historical motivations to treat Kurdish 
groups differently than the Turkish prisoners. We can read the severe attacks against one’s 
sexuality and ethnic identity as in a continuum with the Turkish state’s denial of the Kurdish 
identity and historical fear from an autonomous/independent Kurdish sovereignty in the region. 
Since this ethnic differentiation determined the ways and extent of the repression in Diyarbakir 
prison, and the prisoners formed their responses against this form of repression. I argue that 
inmates’ shared ethnic identity became more salient by overarching their differing political 
positions, and that matters a lot in the formation of more frequent and sustained collective action 
there. 
Before the military coup was declared, restrictions on prisoners’ actions were very limited 
in Diyarbakir prison. Prisoners could bring resources such as books and paper into the prison. 
They were in charge of scheduling their own daily routines and could communicate easily with 
other wards. There were no education sessions or special extra-repressive rules either. However, 
a few months following the coup, repressive sanctions and violence escalated (Ayata 2011a). 
The junta introduced mandatory military educational hours and torture into the daily life of 
the prisoners, similar to the case in Mamak prison. One of the male informants, Sidar, recounts 
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their typical day: “They woke us up around 5-6 am. Without an exception, everyday we had to 
shave, and share one little plastic cup of water with three to five other people. I remember they 
made us shave twice on the same day. We had to salute them as “commander” and stand in 
attention. After the shave, they made us pray and eat something. Then until 11-12pm we had to 
do military exercise in the yard, which included running and shouting military anthems. Same 
thing repeated until dinnertime. They would not let us sit freely even for five minutes. They would 
not give you free time to think. Around 9-10pm everyone had to sleep lying down in a stand still 
position. If one of us would talk to one another during these, they would severely beat us up.”  
Sidar emphasizes: “they ruled our bodies to some extent but not our souls. People lost 
their physical and psychological health but most of us believed that if we were subjected to that 
cruelty because of who we are, then let it be, we won’t give up who we are.” Inmates did not 
only conceive these attacks against their bodies but also their selves, their identities. In the 
following chapter, I will delve into the details of how identity, leadership, repression and 
resistance interacted in these prisons. I will make a content analysis of the interviews I did to 
present my data more clearly. 
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Figure 4: Normative education session in Diyarbakir Prison 
 
Source:  http://en.habervesaire.com/haber/1604/ 
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6.0  CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN 
MAMAK AND DIYARBAKIR PRISONS 
6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF THE INMATES IN MAMAK AND 
DIYARBAKIR PRISONS BETWEEN 1980 AND 1985 
 
The table below shows the demographic information of my research sample, which corresponds 
to the larger prison population of Mamak and Diyarbakir between 1980 and 1985. 
Table 2: Inmate Age Group 
  Inmate Age Group Sex 
Prison 15-20 20-25 25-30 >30 Male Female 
Diyarbakır 3 6 4 3 13 3 
Mamak 5 5 1 1 7 5 
Source: Author’s compilation, interviews 
Political movements in this period attracted a very young group of people, 67% of the inmates I 
interviewed were incarcerated between the ages 15 and 25 years old. Some of them had already 
been involved in armed skirmishes and guerilla camps in Syria and Palestine prior to the 1980 
coup. 
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Table 3: Education Level of the Inmates 
 
Source: Author’s compilation,interviews 
This bar graph shows the education level of my informants when they were incarcerated. 
Even though the difference between Mamak and Diyarbakir is not extreme, this pattern coincides 
with the information available in secondary sources. It suggests that Mamak Prion’s population 
was more urban and better educated than the Diyarbakir Prison.  
In both prisons, political prisoners had the tendency of belittling the guards (the lowest 
ranking soldiers at the time). Aysen, a female prisoner from Mamak, recounts that: “We were all 
very educated and not from some cheap universities like Sutcu Imam or so. There were Teaching 
Assistants and students from METU, AU and doctors too. Soldiers on the other hand were 
philistine, young boys coming from the villages of central Anatolia. Probably, they had not 
interacted with many women before; they harassed us, beat us, they didn’t even know how to 
treat to us. The chief commander Raci Tetik once came to our ward and shouted: “I hate you all, 
you are all so literate and cultured, despite all the bad treatment you see, you still can go-by and 
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laugh!” Can, a male prisoner, from Diyarbakir Prison also shared that: “They were specially 
picking the soldiers to torture us. Most of them were illiterate young boys from central Anatolia 
or Black Sea region. They were all right-wing folks or had some people from MHP in their 
family. These were the people who didn’t even know how to socialize or look after a sheep in 
their villages, but here at the prison they were empowered, they could torture and command us.” 
Second, this distinction reveals itself in the discourse of PKK leaders as they justified the 
positions they take either to call for an action or not. I will describe this in more detail when I 
compare the role of leadership in the two prisons. I also included the number of inmates who 
went to rural boarding school because boarding schools appeared to have a prominent role in 
framing Kurdish students’ ethnic identity in a political context. I will discuss this issue more 
when I compare the role of a collective identity in the mobilization process of a collective action. 
 Even though the difference between educational backgrounds of the soldiers and prisoners 
do not seem to affect collective action directly, this differential status increased the prisoners’ 
feelings of degradation. In Goffman’s analysis one of the mortifying aspects of power is 
humiliation. This includes “disruption of the usual relationship between the individual actor and 
his acts” (Goffman 1961:35). Mostly this disruption takes the form of humiliation such as the 
forced act of deference to call the wardens “commander”, the obligation to humbly ask 
permission to scratch one’s self or to use the toilet. Since, the political prisoners believe that 
normally their status is higher than uneducated soldiers, the disruption of that status order is also 
an attack on their self and on adulthood, which further deteriorates their honor.  
In the Diyarbakir Prison, military rule imposed increasing restrictions and violence 
gradually after the coup, specifically during internal security chief Mevlut Akkoyun’s rule. But 
the hardest and most violent conditions were experienced during Esat Oktay Yildiran’s reign, 
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which was between August 1981 and September 1983. In the Mamak prison military rule was 
enforced nearly two weeks before the coup and intensified within a short time. With the coup, 
officials in both prisons isolated the leaders of political movements into solitary cell 
confinement. Some of these leaders had already been incarcerated before and were experienced 
in determining action plans and ideological education strategies in prisons. Since the leaders 
were isolated and none of the trials had started, communication among prisoners was the biggest 
obstacle to their mass mobilization. Leader cadres of Dev-Yol in Mamak, waited for their trials 
to start before they took action. Since Dev-Yol in Mamak and PKK in Diyarbakir constituted the 
largest groups in these prisons, inmates from smaller organizations did not take action unless 
members or leaders of these organizations join. In both of the prisons, the most effective form of 
collective action was hunger strikes.  
The table in the below shows the number and durability of the declared hunger strikes in 
two prisons. There were fewer and less sustained hunger strikes in Mamak Prison when 
compared to more frequent and sustained attempts in Diyarbakir. 
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Table 4: Chronology of the Hunger Strikes 
Prison 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Mamak   
July 10 
days 
    
February 
42 days December 
3-10 days 
Diyarbakir   
January 8 
days 
  
September 
27 days 
January 
54 days April 43 
days 
Source: Author’s compilation,interviews 
Partizan, Acilciler and Halkin Kurtulusu’s trials started before Dev-Yol’s in Mamak. 
Additionally, some Acilci inmates were transferred to Mamak from the Metris prison, where 
they were already protesting. On July 7, 1981, members of Halkin Kurtulusu, Acilciler, Partizan 
raised the first call for collective action in Mamak, in the form of a hunger strike. According to a 
male informant from Mamak, Mehmet’s account, more than 150 joined the hunger strike for ten 
days, but another smaller group started with fifty people, endured longer and ended with two 
people on the 32nd day.  
Protestors were severely beaten every day in the courtyard and kept in specially designed 
claustrophobic cells called as “tabutluks” (coffins). Since Dev-Yol, with 753 inmates in the 
prison, did not join in the first call to action, a strong enough participation was not attained. The 
strike ended without any collective gain. In the following months, towards the end of 1981, on 
December 21st inmates collectively agreed to start a hunger strike. This time Dev-Yol 
participated. However, soldiers targeted especially the male prisoners on their first three days 
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and made them quit on the third day. Only female prisoners in their separate wards and leaders 
staying in solitary confinement endured this strike until the end for ten days.  
Until the next collective attempt in February 1984, against mandatory uniforms, none of 
the groups tried to mobilize other inmates in the Mamak Prison. Utilization of constant 
repressive measures in Mamak increased towards the end of 1983 again. The military introduced 
mandatory uniforms in all prisons simultaneously. Male prisoners in Mamak resisted wearing 
them, and beatings intensified. Officials were dressing them by force and torture. Soon after they 
were forced to wear the uniforms, the prisoners would tear them off. As the protest persisted, the 
prison authorities decided to negotiate. They offered to accept prisoners’ demands to end 
beatings, military education sessions and verbal humiliation if prisoners would wear the 
mandatory uniforms. As a result, inmates agreed to wear the uniforms and the torture ended in 
Mamak.  
However, the right-wing prisoners were not satisfied with the agreement. The bill of 
indictment for right-wing prisoners’ was accusing 392 detainees, 170 of them were from the 
Ankara region. Still, they were less than the half of the total left-wing prisoners who stayed in 
Mamak Prison between 1980 and 1985. They fabricated a motive and attacked left wing inmates 
at the ward. Soon after, the fight intensified and soldiers reintroduced the education sessions and 
beatings to quell the fight. In turn, left-wing inmates did not obey the rules and started a hunger 
strike. This was the biggest collective action achieved in Mamak Prison. Without any former 
planning, it expanded and endured for 42 days. This time, nearly the entire population 
contributed and the families put pressure on the military officials outside. One of the prominent 
members of Dev-Yol was from a well-known family with close ties to high-ranking army 
members. Oguzhan Muftuoglu says that a member’s father talked to a member of the junta, and 
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he said that if they would give up the hunger strike, Raci Tetik will leave and conditions would 
improve. Upon hearing this, they agreed to quit the hunger strike.  The hunger strike ended with 
prisoner’s acceptance of wearing uniforms in return for ending repressive measures. 
Exceptionally, female prisoners fostered their resistance prior to the agreement by not referring 
to soldiers as “commanders”, and not participating in education hours, among other actions. 
Meanwhile in Diyarbakir Prison, shortly after the military repression started to increase 
towards 1981, the leadership cadre of PKK, confined in isolation from the others, started a 
hunger strike for eight days as a warning on January 4th 1981. That very first hunger strike was to 
show that they did not intend to obey the military rules, and if such rules continued they would 
start a bigger strike. Other inmates also supported them by chanting slogans and hitting keyholes, 
but this protest action generated little support. The main reason for the low participation was due 
to the trials having not yet started. Trials provided the biggest opportunity for the inmates to 
communicate, spread/exchange news and check in with each other.  
A short time after Colonel Esat Oktay was instated, around February 1981, the imposition 
of military rules accelerated and violent attacks against the inmates became widespread. In the 
following months of Colonel Esat’s rule, leaders of the PKK held a second protest. On March 4, 
1981 they started a death fast with 14 others from the cells #35 where well-known, initiator 
members of the PKK, who undertook the leadership positions stayed; this time against Esat 
Oktay’s brutal leadership and to stop violence in the prison. As a result of the attacks during the 
death fast, only 80 to 100 inmates remained non-submissive to the military rules out of a total 
prison population of 1000-2000 at the time. Remaining resisters were refusing to read the 
Turkish Oath and National Anthem, and would not refer to the soldiers as “commander”. During 
the protest, one inmate died as a result of being force fed by the prison doctor. 
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On April 13, 1981, when the hunger strike reached its 40th day; the PKK’s main trail (with 
591 suspects) had already started. Trials were big opportunities for communicating with others as 
well as for voicing their opinions in the official reports. Inmates went to the courthouse pale and 
tired from the hunger strike and did not agree to verify their ID checks as an initial step at the 
trials––another form of protest against judge’s demands. This first hunger strike, initially 
comprised of 25 participants, ended with an agreement with Colonel Esat. According to the 
negotiation, the Colonel agreed not to engage in torture, not to impede inmates’ political 
defenses at the trials, to allow family and lawyer visits to be conducted without beatings and 
restrictions on action, and thereby to end the use of basic necessities such as water, food and 
excretion as means of repression (Welat 2011). In response, inmates would stand at attention like 
soldiers when they would see the guards, and they would go to visits and trials in a single file 
line. Soon after the negotiation, the Colonel stopped respecting the agreement and started 
practicing torture again. By May 24, 1981, the last remaining resistant leader cadre finally agreed 
to obey the military rules and suffer that violence.  
Following the pacification of the inmates and escalating torture in Diyarbakir Prison on 
Newroz day22, the March 21, 1982 one of the members of the leadership of PKK, Mazlum 
Dogan, hung himself in his cell, leaving three matches on the ground. Drawing upon the symbols 
of the day and the matches, the PKK framed his suicide as flaunting resistance in the prison.  
Two months after this act, four PKK insurgents self-immolated by starting a fire with thinner, 
plastics and paint that were used to paint the walls and windows with Turkish flags (Yetkin 
                                                 
22  The Kurdish New Years day, which tells the story of a young blacksmith Kawa’s revenge on the cruel king and lighting the resistance fire on 
the mountains of Kurdistan. 
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2010). They left a letter stating that “this is not a life to live” and urged everyone to follow 
Mazlum Dogan, and resist against humiliation and torture (Yetkin 2010).  
These protestors were using their bodies as instruments of resistance and these kind of self-
sacrificing actions created moral shocks as well as heroic martyrdom stories for morale. 
Following these self-sacrificing actions, on 14th July of 1982 the leadership of PKK declared an 
unconditional death fast against the torture. It lasted for 65 days and ended with the death of five 
insurgent leaders. In the end, soldiers and prisoners reached an agreement to end the torture, 
dismiss Esat Oktay from his post, improve the quality of food, and cure the ill insurgents at the 
hospital. These amendments were valid only for the ward #35, where leader cadre’s cells were 
located (Ayata 2011b). This was the first gain of the insurgents but it was only limited to the 
protest participants.  
The biggest collective action of the Diyarbakir Prison with the most widespread 
participation started on September 5th, 1983. It endured for 27 days, and a majority of the 
insurgents participated (Zana 2011). On the 27th day of the hunger strike, an agreement was 
reached. For the first time after three years, torture ended. They had access to pencils and paper, 
were able to talk freely in the wards, corridors and in common spaces, and ordering books from 
outside were free. For the first time, insurgents had the confidence and morale of winning, and 
for the following three months, the insurgents were at ease. A group of insurgents was attacked 
by the soldiers during visiting hours in January 1984, greatly unsettling the group after relatively 
peaceful days. The new civil government imposed the mandatory uniform on all insurgents in all 
prisons of Turkey by the end of 1983. Soon after the beginning of January 1984, a hunger strike 
started against the mandatory military uniform. Unlike the 1983 resistance, leader cadre did not 
organize this action; it started abruptly. This time, the morale, experience and the confidence 
84 
gained by the September 1983 resistance enabled a vast participation. As a result, inmates agreed 
to wear the uniforms but conditions never became notorious as it was before September 1983, 
though repression continued towards the end of 1980s. In the following section I will compare 
the different patterns of collective action in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons by explaining the 
opportunity-threat structures in these prisons. 
6.2 OPPORTUNITY AND THREAT: ROLE OF STATE REPRESSION 
Up until now, despite the repression having been more severe in Diyarbakir Prison between 1980 
and 1983 than in Mamak Prison, we see more frequent and sustained formation of collective 
action in Diyarbakir Prison and fewer faltering instances of collective action in Mamak Prison. I 
argue that task-oriented leadership; competition among the different organizations and the 
inability to mobilize a shared identity in the prison impeded the formation of a large-scale and 
sustained collective action in Mamak.  
In Diyarbakir Prison, during the escalation of repression between 1980 and 1983, we 
witness frequent attempts at collective action. However, these remained limited to the leadership. 
More insurgents were recruited in 1983 and 1984. This is because inmates utilized the 
opportunities opened in 1983, such as the shift to a civilian government, realignment in the 
prison authorities namely Colonel Esat’s transfer, and the opening communication opportunities 
by the beginnings of the trials. For instance, at least one inmate from each ward had to be at the 
PKK’s Suruc group’s trial on September 2, 1983. That was a major opportunity to further 
mobilize inmates and spread the news of the planned action. In addition, there was another factor 
coming from the outside: the PKK launched its first armed attack against the Turkish army in 
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August 1984, and this was celebrated in the prison as a source of morale. The Diyarbakir Prison 
case also suggests that collective action may be more likely during the escalation of repression 
than during periods of stable but high levels of repression. Of course, since this is only one case, 
it cannot suggest a generalized pattern. Moreover, I argue that the main reasons why leaders in 
Diyarbakir Prison could not recruit more insurgents to the early collective actions were their lack 
of the means of communication until the start of the trials, the intensity of repression, and 
competition among organizations. As time went by, shared identity between insurgents 
maintained and the problem of organizational conflicts was overcome in Diyarbakir but not in 
Mamak Prison. 
One of the basic assumptions of opportunity-threat structure is that people can mobilize in 
response to changing political opportunities (Meyer 2004).  According to the political 
opportunity theorists, a large-scale mobilization is often preceded by power realignment or a 
shift in the political power structure. Activists perceive this transformation as a chance to make 
changes in the structure. However, micro-level dynamics also shape changing opportunity-threat 
structures and insurgents’ perceptions of them. For instance, as a result of the negotiations after 
July 1982 hunger strike in Diyarbakir Prison, the chief during the period of most intense torture, 
Colonel Esat Oktay, was removed from duty in early summer of 1983. Inmates’ actions paved 
the way for a change in the power alignment. In that transitional process of the new colonel, 
torture decreased initially, even though it escalated again later. The leader cadre of PKK who 
gained exemption from torture and military rules after the July resistance started planning a 
bigger collective action, which started on September 5, 1983. In addition to the shift to a civil 
government, realignment in the prison authorities and communication opportunity was all in 
thanks to Suruc trial. Other micro-level dynamics such as development of alternative relations 
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under repressive conditions until that time make that collective action possible and sustainable.  
Further, repression in opportunity-threat structure is one of the factors that raise the costs 
of collective action. However, by comparing the mobilization processes in Mamak and 
Diyarbakir Prisons, I have shown that at first the extreme repression in Diyarbakir Prison 
impeded the recruitment to and expansion of collective action beyond core leadership. With 
time, extreme repression created bedrock for prisoners to alter their previously contentious 
relationships by coping with violence and scarce resources together, thus, opening the way for 
more solidary relations.  A male interviewee Haldun explains how they perceived the intensity of 
the repression and how it acted as a barrier to collective action too: “Everybody realized that we 
had to do something. But you got beaten, or even raped with truncheons just even because you 
talk to the person next to you. I wanted to die for hundreds of time but there is the possibility of 
not managing it. What if I cannot kill myself? Then the torture would be worse than suicide. If 
you survive from the suicide then it is worse than death. Sometimes death was something that we 
could not achieve by ourselves.  
As the interviewee suggests, between 1981 and 1983 in the case of Diyarbakir prison, 
extreme repression creates the will to act against the repression but it also depresses the 
conditions to form a collective action. If we include that rumors of death and gossip as factors 
that created a climate of suspicion in the prisons, as well as intensifying violence, it is, thus, less 
likely that prisoners will engage in collective action.  
According to the process of change in opportunity-threat structure, certain micro- and 
meso-level dynamics might develop, such as reframing the meaning of identity, emotions and 
developing interpersonal relations. My thesis shows that the main determinant of mobilization is 
the formation of a shared identity, the role of leaders in that process, and the formation of new 
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relations under the conditions of changing opportunity/threat structure. The military chose 
different ways to increase repression in the two prisons. In Mamak Prison, changing of the power 
structure started earlier and with immediate violent attacks in a short time; in Diyarbakir Prison 
violence increased gradually between 1980 and 1983 but was sustained longer and at greater 
intensity than in Mamak. In Mamak Prison, military rule started before the coup on August 28, 
1980 with special commandos, shooting around the prisoners and severely beating the prisoners. 
This caused the death of one on the very first night that they imposed the military rule in the 
prison. Other than differing in its temporal process of imposition, the military had different 
repressive policies in two prisons. 
Table 5: Similarities and Differences of Diyarbakir & Mamak Prisons 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
 DIYARBAKIR MAMAK 
Prison Type Military, Military Practices 
Imposed on Prisoners’ Daily 
Routines 
Military, Military Practices 
Imposed on Prisoners’ Daily 
Routines 
Prisoner Rights Banned Banned 
Gender Distribution  Majority Male Majority Male 
Visibility in    
Level of State Violence and 
Repression 
Extreme and Indiscriminative  Moderate and Selective 
Leaders among Prisoners  High Risk Taking Leaders, 
Leaders Isolated from Their 
Groups 
Low Risk Taking Leaders, 
Leaders Isolated from Their 
Groups 
Communal lives  Banned Allowed, Cohabitation of 
Right and Left-Wing 
Prisoners 
Political Affiliation of 
Prisoners 
High, Mostly Affiliated with 
Kurdish Organizations, No 
Right-Wing Prisoners 
High, Mostly Turkish Left-
Wing Prisoners 
Cooperation Among 
Prisoners 
A lot of Informants (snitches) Few Informants (snitches) 
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I show some of the differences and similarities in the Table 5 above. First, the military 
allowed prisoners to live communally based on their organizations in Mamak prison but they 
banned communal living based on organizations in Diyarbakir Prison. Second, they mixed right 
wing and left-wing political prisoners in wards and cells in Mamak; and there were no right-wing 
prisoners in Diyarbakir. Third, violence was selective in Mamak and indiscriminate in 
Diyarbakir. Fourth, repression towards ethnic identity (Kurds) and sexuality were severe in 
Diyarbakir, and it did not exist in Mamak Prison. Fifth, torture was much more violent in 
Diyarbakir Prison, but for the majority of the population it did not go beyond severe beating and 
“falaka” (beating the soles of the foot) in Mamak Prison. Though, the conditions of the leaders 
were similar, they were both isolated in the cells in both of the prisons. However, their positions 
were different. Leaders in Mamak did not take the same risky initiatives that leaders in 
Diyarbakir did.  
According to my interview data, in Diyarbakir Prison there were no criteria on whom to 
torture. For instance, there were Arab prisoners from the Iraq Communist Party, elderly peasants 
or neighbors or relatives of insurgents without any relation to political organizations, smugglers; 
and even a German tour guide in Diyarbakir Prison. Even those from Iraq Communist Party and 
the German tour guide were forced to follow military rules, torture and memorize the Turkish 
Oath and the military anthems. Moreover, Diyarbakir Prison was also infamous for its high 
number of informers (snitches). However, being an informer and collaborating with the officials 
would not ameliorate the “snitch’s” situations.  
In Mamak Prison on the other hand, cooperation with the wards paid off. For instance, 
Raci Tetik separated the cooperative female prisoners to a ward, where they were exempt from 
severe repression and had more resources. Also, torture in Mamak prison was selective. Most of 
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the prisoners in Mamak Prison experienced the extreme levels of torture in DAL, before arriving 
at the prison. Only selected leaders were subjected to torture other than beating and “falaka” in 
Mamak Prison. Female prisoners were also exempt from “falaka” most of the time; they were 
only beaten by batons on the hands, back, or legs. Furthermore, soldiers consciously picked the 
important people, mostly the leader cadres from Dev-Yol and kept them in “tabutluks.” Leader 
cadres of other organizations were also kept in “tabutluks,” but special attention was given to 
Dev-Yol leaders. Because it was such a vast mobilized organization outside, the administration 
focused its most intense pressure on them. Waiting outside in the cold, beating with baton and 
contaminating the wards were a common experience of them.  
For instance, the four inmates who burned themselves in the middle of the ward in 1982 in 
Diyarbakir Prison were in the so called “confessors’ ward.” By the time they realized the 
intensity of violence did not change for them even though they had cooperated/snitched, they 
made the decision to take action. In Mamak Prison on the other hand, female prisoners say they 
were subjected less severe violence than the male prisoners and leaders were treated worse. For 
instance, Levon Ekmekciyan, an Armenian revolutionary was subjected to worse behavior and 
more humiliation before his execution than the Turkish revolutionaries. However, if inmates 
comply with the soldiers in the prison, they experience less repression. Kalyvas further adds that 
selective violence is effective in enabling deterrence because “the effectiveness of selective 
violence hinges less on pinpoint accuracy and more on a perception among the population that a 
process of selection is taking place” (Kalyvas  2006: 192). Thus, I think the differences in the use 
of repression in the two prisons help account for the different patterns of collective action we 
see. 
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Table 6 shows the difference in the intensity of repression in two prisons. Even though 
these numbers are incomplete because of the unreported events by the junta, it reveals some 
critical patterns. First, I wanted to show how repression in Mamak increased faster before the 
coup and in the first weeks of the coup in 1980. In contrast, it gradually intensified in Diyarbakir 
Prison and stayed at an intensified phase. I think the number of deaths in the early stages of the 
coup in 1980 and the change in that numbers over the years show both the difference in pace of 
repression’s imposition and its intensity. Secondly, as Isa Tekin also shows in his book, 
purposely exposing and infecting prisoners with tuberculosis is a prime example of how 
indiscriminate violence was imposed in Diyarbakir Prison (Tekin 2012).  
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Table 6: Number and Causes of Injuries and Deaths in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons 
 Source: Yılmaz, Ali. 2013. Kara Arşiv: 12 Eylül Cezaevleri. İstanbul: Metis Yayınevi and Author’s compilation 
 
It is difficult to quantify or measure repression. Thus, I made a comparison of prison conditions 
based on the interviews to provide a base for considering how different prison conditions may 
have affected the different outcomes we see in these cases. I determined repressive conditions 
introduced by the military order and counted their mentions in the interviews. Additionally, I 
think comparing the number of inmates who became disabled or died under torture and the 
number of inmates who were executed by the state are also indicators to grasp the difference in 
extent and intensity of the repression in these prisons. 
Table 7 below shows the difference in the extent of the repression in two prisons. It was 
not only in the form of attacking their bodies but also using other daily or natural needs as means 
of repression such as food and water deprivation. Additionally, more existence of occasional 
good relations with soldiers in Mamak also show there was a difference in approaching two 
  DIYARBAKIR MAMAK Grand 
Total Cause of 
Death 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 N/A Total 1980 1982 1983 1985 Total 
Death Fast   4  2   6       6 Death 
Sentenced          3 2 1  6 6 Suicide   5  3 1  9 1 1   2 11 Tortured 
to Death 1 7 13 4 4 3  32 2 1   2 35 Unreporte
d cause of 
death  
1 2 3   8 14   2 2 4 18 
Sub-Total 1 8 24 7 9 4 8 61 6 4 3 2 14 75 
Cause of 
Injury                             
Tuberculos
is       104 104       104 Injured / Crippled 
After Torture 2 5  4  1 12       12 
Grand 
Total 1 10 29 7 13 4 113 177 6 4 3 2 14 192 
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different inmate groups on the military’s side. The greater existence of activities such as singing, 
dancing and theater also shows the difference in restriction of the action in two prisons. Though, 
I should note that instances of laughter, dance and theater appeared in the female prisoners’ 
accounts more than in male prisoners’ accounts. Subsequently, as Della Porta (1996:66) attempts 
to typologize repression based on five dimensions: ‘repressive’ versus ‘tolerant’, based on ‘the 
range of prohibited behavior’; ‘selective’ versus ‘diffuse’, assessed by the array of repressed 
groups; ‘preventive’ versus ‘reactive’, based on the timing of police repression; ‘hard’ versus 
‘soft’, as judged by ‘the degree of force involved’; and ‘dirty’ versus ‘lawful’, based on ‘the 
degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is emphasized’. In comparison, state 
repression in the cases I choose was more tolerant, selective, soft and “lawful” in Mamak prison 
whereas it was more repressive, diffused, hard and dirty in Diyarbakir prison. 
Table 7: Degree of Repressive Policies in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons 
 
     Source: Author’s compilation 
 
185
0 8
12 23
3 8
8 48
286
Occasional good treatment of the soldiers
Poor hygiene, overcrowd
Food and Water deprivation
Verbal humiliation, rape, sexual harrasment, torture(other than beating with baton and falaka)
Restrict on action: visitation,move in wards,speaking
Morale:Laughter,singing,dancing,jokes,theater,humor
Number of Conditions Reported in 
Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons
Diyarbakir Mamak
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6.3 HOW DID MICRO AND MESO-LEVEL DYNAMICS VARY UNDER DIFERENT 
POWER STRUCTURES? 
6.3.1 Collective Identity, Emotions and Honor in Re-framing Resistance 
One of the main differences between Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons is the salience of Kurdish 
identity in the process of mobilization in Diyarbakir Prison. Nearly all of the prisoners’ mother 
tongue was Kurdish; speaking Kurdish was banned in the prison and not all the Kurdish 
prisoners were fluent Turkish speakers. Insurgents had experienced verbal humiliation and 
additional torture because of speaking Kurdish among themselves, during family visits and also 
refusing to say that they are “Turks”. Colonel Esat Oktay once told the insurgents: “Don’t call 
this place as a prison! This place is a school, where you will learn to be worthy of Turkish nation 
and Ataturk.”(Welat 2011) Therefore, Junta’s aim was not only to destroy the organizational 
networks of Kurdish revolutionary insurgents, but also to continue assimilating the Kurds 
(Zeydanlioglu 2009).  
Actually interviewees showed me how they bridge their initial consciousness of 
“Kurdishness”, which started to develop when they started school or before in the family, to their 
perception of shared identities in the prison. Extra humiliation due to their ethnic identity helped 
them see that they have more commonalities than their revolutionary stances in the prison. 
I also included a boarding school parameter to the demographic table where I show the 
education levels of the interviewees. Interviews from Diyarbakir prison showed me boarding 
schools, yibo(s) and teacher schools, especially the teacher schools in Kirsehir and Dersim, are 
focal spaces where Kurdish youth affiliates with a political organization. Boarding schools for 
Kurdish youth was a confrontational place where they stay with Turkish students and educated 
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with the official state ideology. Those schools were the places where they continued gaining an 
understanding of their ethnic identity and politicized as being the oppressed and despised in the 
country they live in.  
In Diyarbakir Prison, the soldiers’ aim was to make them internalize that prison’s 
institutional sub-world of a militarized Turkishness, wherein they were humiliated and tortured 
because of their ethnic identities and ideological stances. As a response to this forced 
socialization, inmates developed their own underlives, in Goffman’s terms where they could 
create their alternative communes.  
Moreover, after the torture sessions, Colonel Esat would ask them if they were “Turks” or 
not, and if they said “yes,” he would send them to the wards, but if they said “no I am a Kurd,” 
he would continue to torture them and kept in cells. Thus, practices like those continue shaping 
their perceptions of a shared identity throughout their socialization in the prison. At this point, 
Gamson (1992b) proposes that “a necessary precondition of successful mobilization is a well-
defined and shared understanding of “us” and “them”—the solidary notion of who we are must 
be supplemented by clear agreement over who or what we are against. To the degree that an 
identifiable enemy exercises power by attempting to humiliate or degrade, this can heighten an 
insurgent group’s collective identity, if that insurgent group develops tactics to neutralize or 
transcend humiliation.” (p.12) I think this differentiation of “us” and “them” also blurs the lines 
between organizations. As these repressive and violent implications towards their bodies and 
identities continued, inmates started to perceive the soldiers not only to combat with their 
revolutionary organizations but also to destroy their self-perceptions. Another former male 
inmate Engin illustrates this situation by stating: “The issue was not to pacify the inmates, it was 
to break Kurdish people’s will. Continued humiliation of the inmates’ ethnic identities, other 
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than creating the situation of loss of adulthood, self-determination and autonomy also worked for 
prisoners to frame their resistance under “defense of Kurdish honor and the honor of humanity.” 
Similarly former imale nmate Nurettin says: “Their aim was to destroy our identity and leave 
without a personality” This salient aspect of clearing the boundaries between “us” and “them” 
over their own ideological distinctions in Diyarbakir Prison was one of missing things in Mamak 
Prison.   
There was no repression targeting one’s ethnic identity or sexuality in Mamak Prison. 
Thus, inmates could not frame their insurgent identities in other ways than their organizational 
affiliations. I argue that there are two reasons for that. First, inmates could form good relations 
with some of the soldiers via “townsmanship” (hemsehrilik23) and religious affiliation. Alevite 
soldiers were more in favor of left wing ideologies, therefore they were not treating the inmates 
as cruel as the non-Alevite soldier-guards and from time to time they were helping the inmates. 
Second, historically Turkish left-wing organizations have some kind of faith in the military as a 
potential ally for the revolution24.  
Third, there were some affectual platonic relationships on the side of the soldiers to the 
female prisoners. Here are some examples to the good relations with the soldiers: Kaya:  “One 
guardian was a sympathizer of the HK. They had a song about their comrade shot in Antep, for 
example that guardian asked me to sing that song. One day he came and asked me if I had killed 
the Muradiye Mayor, I said ‘no,’ he thought I was lying, but really Kawa was responsible of that 
action. That kid appeared to be from Muradiye, he thanked me for killing the mayor, even though 
I didn’t. Some of those soldiers helped us a great deal then they were punished for that. We were 
                                                 
23 An informal tie between people that fosters trust and help; based on coming from the same town, village or city. 
24 MDD tradition. 
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so sorry for them to have been beaten because of carrying messages in between us. Then they 
said: “They beat us once, but you are beaten every day. Good boys they were.”   
Another female inmate from Mamak, Kamer says: “Those soldiers were also in twenties. 
There were both fascist and leftist guardians. Alevites were pro-left wing prisoners most of the 
time. We could also form ties via hemsehrilik. There was one from my village who helped me a 
lot. He carried messages from my mom to me. Once he asked me what I missed the most, and I 
told him ‘sunflower seeds.’ He brought me a package but it blew while he was throwing it from 
the loophole. They tortured him a great deal, his military service ended because of me. Some of 
them fell in love with us too. Once one gave a lipstick to Figen (laughes)” 
Moreover, some prisoners during a beating session chanted “Soldiers and people are 
brothers!” and, as time went by, prison administration felt the need to hang a banner saying: 
“Compassion for the convict is betraying the homeland”(Yildiz 2001 p. 165). These  accounts 
show that the political prisoners in Mamak Prison did not maintain clear boundaries between 
them and the soldiers to frame a shared collective identity by overcoming their organization 
based conflicts to counter the soldiers as the prisoners in Diyarbakir did. In Diyarbakir Prison, 
prisoners could perceive themselves as being “the Kurdish people” versus “the Turkish state,” or 
“the colonizer enemy.”  The relationship between collective identity and action is reciprocal and 
reproduces itself with the changing dynamics of the process as it did in Diyarbakir Prison 
(O’Hearn 2013). However, in Mamak prison, that dialectic did not forge a shared identity, 
prisoners did not clearly distance themselves from the soldiers as themselves being 
“revolutionaries” and the soldiers being “the enemy state,” for example.   
What is more important is how leaders framed collective identity during the mobilization 
process. In Diyarbakir prison, the leaders of PKK framed their resistance as a “fight for honor.” 
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For example, on the morning of September 5, 1983, during the roll call, slogans came from the 
ward # 27. For the first time since 1980, slogans were chanted in the prison (Tekin 2012). A 
strong voice was shouting: “Comrades! Revolutionaries! Democrats! Patriots! This is the day of 
honor! This is the day of riot! Slogans from other wards followed this initiation “Human dignity 
will beat torture!” “Damn colonialism!” and even “Long live death!” was chanted as a slogan. In 
a way, death, resistance and honor were equated in Diyarbakir Prison.  
In Mamak Prison, leaders allowed everybody to be responsible for their own bodily 
survival. The concept of preserving one’s honor or equating it with resistance did not appear. 
Since the concept of honor appeared mostly when they were telling about sexual and ethnic 
humiliation in Diyarbakir Prison, I checked for the same targets in Mamak Prison. A former 
male inmate Kadri said: “There wasn’t torture targeting sexuality in the prison. However at the 
interrogation in DAL, everything happened: rape, sitting on a bottle, rape with baton etc. In 
Mamak, it was to a lesser extent like bending, hitting in the ass, creeping, duck walk”. This is 
valid for the male prisoners. Female prisoners had more to say on sexual attacks, which I will 
present in the following section. 
As I said before, the concept of honor appeared in the interviews mostly when they were 
telling me about the torture and humiliation against their sexualities and ethic identities of the 
Kurdish insurgents. These are some examples that my informants gave when they were 
describing the incidents that they felt their honor was under attack. A male informant, Tekin 
from Diyarbakir Prison says: “Colonel Esat once said that “you will be ashamed of yourselves 
when you are released from here, your women will not sleep with you again.”Sidar continues: 
“Once they wanted all of us to spit on a friend’s face and then urinate on him. None of us did 
that, they beat the hell out of us, but we didn’t spit or urinate on a friend. Then they took that 
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soldier away since he couldn’t make us spit or urinate on a friend. This was a very normal thing 
to reject, but we felt extremely happy for not doing that. Especially between 1980 and 1984, they 
did everything to make us feel dishonored. They forced people to rape their fellows, checked our 
penis to see if we were circumcised, tied a rope to our penis and pulled like we were a line train, 
and more that I cannot say.” For instance, all the informants I have interviewed have 
experienced sitting in a sewage pool by force in Diyarbakir Prison. As Einwohner also argues 
that honor can be a motivational factor and facilitate collective action when combined with the 
opportunities (2003); resistance becomes a way to maintain honor, sometimes suicidal protest 
acts like the ones in 1982 and 1984 in Diyarbakir Prison are seen as self-preserving rather than 
self-sacrificing. 
Diverging from the male prisoners, female insurgents have found ways to construct a 
culture of resistance in Mamak prison. They agreed to never refer to the soldiers as 
“commander,” they refused to attend the mandatory education sessions, they cooperated with 
each other in the wards by preserving dialogue in between different political organizations’ 
communes and pursued all of the hunger strike calls despite the increasing state violence (except 
Dev-Yol members at the first call in July 1981). In addition, not extending their hand for 
truncheon and refusing to chant the Turkish oath when soldiers asked, all served as parts of their 
culture of resistance. I did not find evidence of these kinds of collective decisions in the male 
prisoners’ wards.  
For example, even though female Dev-Yol inmates did not join the first hunger strike, they 
resisted by not allowing the soldiers take the female strikers to solitary confinement. Ninety-nine 
of them were tried specifically for resisting soldiers on that day and they did not give headcount 
after that incident, which is a very unusual and risky way of protest in a military prison. In the 
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second hunger strike, although the male prisoners gave up on the third day, female prisoners 
endured till the final, tenth day. They revealed most of the accounts I recorded about free spaces 
in the prisons, laughter, and humor. For example, they had a beauty contest on “who has the best 
scars from the last beating” and they were preparing small plays.  
A female informant, Senay says: “There was passive resistance until the removal of 
colonel Raci Tetik and introduction of forced uniform in 1984.” What she means by passive 
resistance is parallel with Scott’s conceptualization of a hidden transcript: every subordinate 
group creates, a "hidden transcript" that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of 
the dominant (1990). Another female informant, Nurgul explains: “We named the guards, we 
were mimicking them and laughing, we laughed a lot. As they hear us laugh they came in and 
beat more, there was nothing more than our laughter driving them crazy in the prison.” The 
concepts of hidden and public transcripts provide us tools to interpret the rumors, gossip, 
gestures and jokes of the powerless as anonymous and insinuating backstage vehicles as critique 
of the power. Therefore, the fact that prisoners in Mamak prison could not sustain collective 
action in prison does not mean that they were not resisting or they had no claims to make.   
However, the exceptional situation of the female prisoners is not detached from the rest. 
There were differences in the implication of repression to female and male prisoners. Female 
prisoners repeatedly stated that they were not subjected to severe beatings as male prisoners 
were. Additionally, since prisons are architecturally designed for males and female bodies’ 
political imprisonment was seen as a very extra ordinary situation for the state, prison 
administration could not decide how to behave or situate female political prisoners. First, they 
did not put females to Mamak Prison. Instead, they brought women to a high school building 
called “2 yillik.” In that school building, there were no military rules, violent or repressive 
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conditions, iron bars or doors. Furthermore, since it was designed as a school building, prisoners’ 
interaction with outside was commonplace via wide windows. Female prisoners formed bonds in 
that school building and when they were moved to Mamak Prison, they preserved their solidary 
bonds. In the first call of action female Dev-Yol members followed the males and did not join 
the hunger strike. However, in the second call, despite all the males’ giving up on the third day, 
females continued until the end. 
Here, I argue that using one’s body for collective purposes, such as smuggling cigarettes in 
one’s hair bun or smuggling paper notes inside one’s body shows us how resistance not only 
opposes the power but also creates its own space and control over one’s body. Thus, female 
political prisoners in Mamak Prison, between the years of 1980 and 1985, show that prisoners 
could escape from the grid of discipline and panoptic gaze. One of the former prisoners stated 
that there were guards whose shifts involved staring at the ward from the window of the ward. 
Prisoners were using their bodies as curtains in front of each other when they needed to exchange 
an item or news to escape the gaze. Furthermore, they said that there were blind points of the 
ward, for example the cooking area.  
As an example of the creative aspect of the resistance, tens of female political prisoners 
rehearsed in the cooking area while some others were curtaining and guarding the door for them. 
In a month they were ready to perform a play on the Uruguay revolution. At first, the deduction 
of everyday forms of resistance sounds difficult to determine and analyze them. Nonetheless, a 
thick description of the everyday actions of the political prisoners, namely, looking for the 
meaning and consciousness that they attach to their actions showed me how subjects could bend 
the limits of disciplinary power with relational and productive resistance tactics in the contexts 
where they cannot break those limits of power.  Their resistance was capable of reshaping power 
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by bending, mocking, or getting round the power relations. Thus, female prisoners’ experience in 
Mamak shows that once a shared identity and solidary ties formed, even though the threat 
increases–when they were moved to Mamak from the school building– insurgents could preserve 
their culture of resistance. 
6.3.2 Role of Effective Leadership in High-Risk Collective Action 
Leadership has an important role in motivating and recruiting followers to take action. Gamson 
says that it might be easier to persuade someone to sign a petition but to invite someone to high-
risk actions such as hunger strike in a prison is not the same as the former (1991). I argue that the 
lack of people-oriented leadership and enduring contested relationships between the different 
organizations impeded the formation of sustained and large-scale collective action in Mamak 
Prison.  I discussed Aminzade’s categorization of leader types before into  “people-oriented” and 
“task-oriented.” I also already presented that if the organization with the vast population does not 
take action, it does not make much sense in the eyes of the prison authorities. Therefore, 
followers were waiting for Dev-Yol in Mamak, and the PKK in Diyarbakir to take action first. 
Between 1980 and 1983, PKK leaders declared hunger strikes for three times, and some of them 
committed suicides and self-immolated. Expectedly, gradual deviation from the old less 
constraining prison management model to a strict military discipline, led to reactions among the 
inmates.  
Loveman states that “early risers” (in cases of severe repression) may mobilize in response 
to, not despite, severe repression; their actions may then create space for later waves of 
participants who may indeed be responding to relative improvements in the structure of 
opportunities”(1998). The overt protestors of 1980-1982 in Diyarbakir Prison and the ones who 
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started the first hunger strike on July 1981, in Mamak Prison can also be considered as “early 
risers.” However, the difference is that early risers in Diyarbakir Prison pursued their leading 
position in the course of actions to recruit more people until the conditions they protested ended. 
Leader cadres in Mamak Prison on the other hand, did not re-frame the situation in the prison to 
forge mobilization; instead they waited for another threat to occur, which happened with 
imposition of mandatory uniforms in 1984. 
Thus, I refer to them as people-oriented leaders who “reshape followers’ framing” of the 
situations to take action. Leaders of Dev-Yol can be counted as “task-oriented,” since they only 
took a role in negotiating with the authorities on conditions when ending a protest, and made 
individual political defenses in the courts. Below is the comparison of the two different types of 
leadership in Mamak and Diyarbakir: 
From Mamak, a male informant, Celal says: “Dev-Yol was not a hierarchical 
organization, we didn’t have a formal membership status. The leader cadres never conceived of 
themselves, as they were still leaders inside. If one inmate asked them what to do, how to 
respond the state repression, they would respond as: “We are at the same level with you guys, 
we all have the same one-vote right as you have, so we cannot tell you what to do here. Under 
these dangerous conditions everyone is responsible of his own survival.”  
Furthermore, one of the leaders of Dev-Yol, Oguzhan Muftuoglu, says: “We were 
devastated when 204 of the central members of Dev-Yol in managing positions were arrested 
and released information about the rest. We were really depressed. As leaders, we stepped back 
in the prison; I did not make an organizational-based defense in the trials as well. There was no 
organization left, I made my defense based on a movement.”(Bostancioglu 2011:252-254) 
Despite leaders’ rejection of the leadership in the prison, prison officials considered them as their 
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addressee. For example, to end the biggest hunger strike of Mamak in 1984, officials talked to 
Dev-Yol leaders, took them to each ward so that they would announce that the hunger strike had 
ended. In turn, inmates agreed wearing the uniforms as a compromise for ending the repression 
and daily violence in the prison. This is also an example for a task-oriented leadership. 
Additionally, since vast numbers of followers of Dev-Yol were captured after dissolution in the 
central committee when 204 of them were caught, “snitches” in the prison were another big 
problem facing mobilization. A male informant, Kadir says: “Dev-Yol leaders waited very long, 
until the trials had started, to take action. They were afraid of risking others’ lives as well as 
increasing the number of “snitches.” Therefore, they eschewed creating conditions suitable for 
that, too. 
In Diyarbakir Prison, on the other hand, informants’ accounts parallel Viterna’s analysis 
that “in high-risk contexts maintaining an identity or networks alone are unlikely to generate 
participation unless a specific recruitment attempt is made” (Viterna 2013:57). In parallel with 
Viterna, a male interviewee Can states: “Leaders should walk first. If they don’t, no one will 
follow; people want to see leaders in the battle field, fighting for them.” This account also 
coincides with O’Hearn’s findings that leadership has a critical role in organizing and framing a 
collective action (2013). Especially in Diyarbakir Prison when the leaders take risks on behalf of 
everyone, they foster morale, trust, respect and solidarity amongst the followers. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that the difference in the ways of leadership in two prisons depended not 
only on their strategic choices. One of the PKK leaders when organizing a hunger strike says: 
“The majority of our followers were peasants or workers, who did not get ideological education 
or read the revolutionary materials as we did. We know why we are here, but they might not. We 
should not let them feel abandoned, they are here because of us so we should be the ones to take 
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responsibility for their survivals, and give them some morale.”(Sunar 2015) Thus, different from 
Dev-Yol leaders, since PKK leaders were aware of the demographics of their followers, they 
were in favor of taking risks. Probably, Dev-Yol leaders were aware of their followers’ level of 
ideological consciousness and did not feel an extra need to pioneer for them, since most of them 
were urban university or high school students. That is to say, their decisions were not only 
individual or ideological but also based on the context of their movements. I noted this point 
about the discourse of the leaders under the demographic comparison of the two prisons. 
6.3.3 Organizational Networks and Interpersonal Relations in Mamak and Diyarbakir 
Prisons 
Another factor in front of a large-scale and sustained collective action besides the intensity of 
violence at that time was the organizational conflicts in both of the prisons. The cases I 
investigate provided evidence to support my claim that even though repression might cause 
demobilization and depression or hopelessness among the inmates at times through the process, 
it also opens space for alternative interactions, sharing, and trust to develop. Especially, if the 
leaders play a will-taking role in this process, mobilization is more likely. That is to say, 
increasing threats for a movement has the potential to turn into an opportunity if the leaders 
could channel the dynamics at micro-level interactions such as emotions and a shared collective 
identity into forces for recruitment. 
Prior to September 1980, each political organization had its own ward and commune in 
which they controlled the space and the resources in it. For instance a male informant, Ferhat 
from Mamak tells: “Before the coup we could obtain anything in the prison, I even had my own 
gun. We could visit other wards and spend our time as we wished.” Dursun from Diyarbakir 
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prison tells: “Martial law was in practice since 1978 but there was no military rules or 
restrictions until the morning of September 12, 1980. We had our radio, books and other things, 
they started constraining after the coup.” Another male inmate from Diyarbakir Prison said: “On 
the morning of September 12, 1980, manners of the guard changed and he started not 
responding our demands. Then we heard on the radio that the military had intervened. We 
chanted slogans and sang anthems so the outside would hear us…we were hopeful that DISK 
would resist, Dev-Yol, Kurtulus, PKK, KUK those were the organizations with vast followers But 
as time went by and the visitors told, we understood that nobody was collectively resisting 
outside.” These accounts both show that prison order was not that strict and regulatory before the 
coup, and inmates had great hope in the organizations that they were attached to for pursuing 
resistance outside. 
In contrast with the abovementioned accounts, post-1980 coup d’état, military rule in the 
prison did not allow the political prisoners to continue their daily practices as they wished. For 
example, commune systems in the wards were eventually forbidden, and authorities dispersed 
the members of the same organization to different wards in Diyarbakir Prison. Diverse political 
organizations competed with one another. For example, PKK and KUK even got into armed 
skirmishes over ideological conflicts outside and over who gets to have the power of being the 
prominent organization in the Kurdish region prior to the military coup. These conflicts echoed 
within the prison as well. Therefore, banning the organizational communes and dispersing 
inmates to the wards to merge them with members of the different organizations was successful 
at first to impede their formation of solidarity.  
As the interviewee Can from Diyarbakir Prison, a former member of the KUK, stated: 
“Normally KUK and PKK are enemies, sometimes in the prison we were helping each other. 
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However, we did not join their calls of action in 1981. PKK members from the nearby ward 
informed us, via communicating through a water hose. They passed the message asking if we 
individually wanted to join, we could start with them the following day. As a response, we said 
that we were members of a political organization and if they forsake our organization, we 
wouldn’t join them individually. They said that they considered KUK as an extension of the 
Turkish National Intelligence Organization, but they knew that there were good people among 
us.”  
A similar account from Mamak Prison: “Halkin Kurtulus and TKP was not in dialogue at 
all. Dev-Yol was despised in the prison too, they rejected joining the first call of action.” Left-
wing revolutionary organizations of the 1970s in Turkey fragmented according to the different 
political traditions of Soviets, China, Cuba, and Albania. Most of the conflicts between the 
organizations stemmed from the different model country experiences they choose to follow. 
These accounts suggest that the weak and contested relations and poor communication impeded 
the willingness of other groups to join each other’s calls at first.  
In addition to organizational conflicts in Mamak, left-wing insurgents were forced to live 
with right-wing political prisoners, who used to literally look for instances to kill each other 
outside. This difference increased the impossibility of formation of solidarity or an action plan in 
the wards or cells in Mamak Prison. Mixing left- with right-wing prisoners meant a double-
isolation for leftists, since right-wing prisoners were aligned with the soldiers. A male informant, 
Kaya tells: “If the food came while I was at the trial and the fascist cell mate took it in, I would 
not eat it. During Ramadan, they wanted to sleep at the lower deck because fasting made them 
dizzy. We did not allow that; we refused any kind of relation with them. Only the commune 
representatives of both sides would talk if there is a problem or write the canteen list together.” 
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Additionally, since the military allowed them to pursue communal lives based on organizations, 
each political organization formed their own commune and only the commune spokesmen was in 
touch to transmit the ideas or requests of the sides for the left-wing organizations too.  
Another puzzle is to make sense of these contested relations between organizations in the 
prison. McAdam’s study on Freedom Summer shows how interpersonal relationships and 
friendship networks matter in recruitment into action. He facilitates our understanding of how the 
abovementioned contested relations between organizations play role in forming collective action. 
He argues the types of social networks within which potential participants are embedded affect 
micro mobilization processes (1986). Furthermore, Loveman states that this is especially the case 
for recruitment to potentially risky forms of collective action (1998). Thus, I think between the 
years of 1980-1983 leaders’ onset of collective actions couldn’t be expanded to the followers 
because of the contested social networks and intensity of violence in Diyarbakir prison. The 
effect of contested relations, doubled in Mamak because of right-wing inmates. Additionally, the 
lack of people-oriented leadership and reframing a shared identity were other impediments to a 
collective action between 1980 and 1984 in Mamak Prison. 
Although I stated the dampening impact of intense repression on collective action by 
barring the formation of interpersonal relations, it must also be noted too that repression can also 
become constructive in forming solidarity. For instance, to cope with this isolationist policy of 
forbidding the communal livings based on organizations, inmates formed secret groupings based 
on “townsmanship” (hemsehrilik), neighborhood and familial/traditional ties in Diyarbakir 
Prison and pursued communal livings with those smaller cliques. Coping with violence together, 
sharing torture, water and food in the scarcest conditions produced trust and solidary relations 
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between the members of different contested groups. In a way, prisoners’ biggest threat of state 
repression yielded an opportunity for them to form new solidary relations.  
Kleinmann further shows that violence has consequences such as suffering and means of 
coping, it destroys inmates’ local worlds and perceived differences by turning everyone into 
victims, violence gives birth to a opportunity of coming together under shared claims (2000). 
Interviewee Can explains these alternative relations: “After a while, enmities between different 
organizations in the prison became invisible. We saw that the only enemy that is trying to destroy 
us was the state. We could not have survived if we didn’t act together. Moreover, if one is from a 
different organization, but at the same time he is from my village, kinship (asiret) or family, and I 
don’t help him, it would be insulting my family. If I confess that person’s political acts outside, 
or spy on him inside, their family would say’ the son of Haci Aziz is dishonorable.’ I could not do 
this to the reputation of my family.” Therefore, we should acknowledge that both the operation 
of power and resistance is a dynamic and variable process and this process does not have a fixed 
beginning or end, just as no socio-historical process does. It can be cyclical - the relations can 
reiterate themselves or it can be spiral - the reiteration could reach a progressive point as did in 
the case of alternative commune formation. The communes in wards improved both the 
psychological and physical health of the prisoners by fostering solidarity and instances of 
organized movements against prison authority. 
I already showed how more traditional ties depending on kinship or on hemsehrilik ties 
based the same village/town among inmates functioned to form solidarity under repression in 
Diyarbakir Prison. At this point, Gould presents that personal ties such as kinship or close 
friendship are particularly important for recruitment to high-risk activism (Gould 1991). Reinoud 
Leender’s analysis on the role of tribal networks in mobilization of people in Syria also suggests 
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that “these networks offered relatively autonomous sites for the sharing of grievances, the 
circulation and interpretation of information, and the framing of state repression, as well as 
solidarity, skills, and resources for mobilization under prohibitive conditions of massive 
repression.” (Leenders 2012: 425-429) In a high-risk environment full of informers around the 
ward, formation of trustful and solidary ties were harder than usual. Thus, these alternative 
relations, other than organizational, developed under the repressive conditions contributed to the 
widespread mobilization process for the September 5, 1983 resistance in Diyarbakir Prison.  
In Mamak Prison, on the other hand, conditions never deteriorated enough to break the 
partisan boundaries for a sustained large-scale collective action until 1984; when administration 
abruptly attacked them and everybody protested mandatory uniforms. That is not to say that 
prisoners were not sharing time together or help each other if needed. Especially, the allowance 
for organization-based communes and cohabiting right-wing prisoners supported the negative 
conditions for maintaining trust and solidarity and break the organizational boundaries, which 
are crucial for recruitment. In brief, the case of Diyarbakir prison shows that the state violence, 
to some extent creates the bedrock to form an alternative space and collective action based on 
shared experience, emotions and coping strategies in the prison. These interpersonal relations, 
different from the organizational ties, contributed to the changing shared identity of the 
insurgents during the process and fostered willingness to join collective action too. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
 
Within the scope of this thesis, role of risk-liable and people-oriented leadership together with a 
shared identity occurred as the most prominent dynamics to forge collective action in the prisons. 
The salience of Kurdish identity in a Turkish military prison should be noted to see the role of 
identity. I examined the dynamics of collective action in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons between 
1980 and 1985 through experiences of 28 former prisoners.  Starting with the theoretical 
background chapter, first I visited collective action theories in brief chronology such as 
collective behavior, rational choice, resource mobilization and political process approaches. I 
introduced a blend of theoretical approaches to have a better understanding of my cases by 
situating micro and meso-level dynamics, such as interpersonal relations, emotions, 
organizational networks, framing a shared collective identity and role of leadership, into 
opportunity-threat structure in the prisons.  
I also visited prison riot theories briefly, but neither rising expectations nor the inmate-
balance theory were solely appropriate for my cases. I approached prisons as places shaped by 
the interaction between repression and resistance instead of idealized panoptic spaces where 
power ubiquitously enacts. As in Goffman’s study of total institutions, where inmates create 
defensive adjustments against the degrading aspects of power, my cases also show that 
repression as a threat can create bedrock for collectivizing those defensive adjustments.  
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Subsequently, in the historical background chapter I documented the transformation of the 
state’s approach to the prisons in Turkish Prisons since the 1920s. We witness how institutional 
changes happened in relation to societal changes. One of the biggest determinants of those 
societal changes was the upheaval in social movements. Moreover, I documented the historical 
relationship of the political opposition and incarceration stemming in Ottoman Empire. I 
presented the both politically and economically contentious era of the 1970s before the 1980 
military intervention. The era between 1974 and 1980 was very significant for polarization of 
Kurdish and Turkish revolutionary organizations. State repression managed to suppress the 
armed Turkish revolutionary organizations together with many other Kurdish organizations and 
their networks with the coup. However, PKK chose guerilla warfare strategy starting in 1984 and 
still continues its struggle for a liberated, self-governing Kurdish region in Turkey. 
Since discussions on the impact of repression on collective action do not agree at one point 
we need to contextualize each case and look for the differences. For instance, to form a collective 
action in high-risk contexts, merely acknowledging threats and opportunities is not enough to 
recruit insurgents. Without the existence of solidary interpersonal ties, trust in the leaders’ 
willpower in taking risks and channeling emotions like anger, dignity/honor and fear into 
collective identity; observing collective action would be very rare in high-risk environments. 
These dynamics explain the scarcer and less sustainable collective action in Mamak and greater 
with more sustainable actions in Diyarbakir. Overall, I argued that repression drives collective 
action if there is a risk-liable leadership and a shared identity together with solidary relations 
between the insurgents in undemocratic and high-risk conditions. 
Further, the differences in the state’s repression, its extent, intensity and temporality 
between the two prisons carried a significant importance in determining inmates’ resistance. 
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Thus, interaction between the extent of repression and resistance help us understand the prison 
order.  When approaching to repression’s effects, I mainly utilized Kalyvas’s conceptualizations 
of selective and indiscriminate violence to explain the different outcomes of state repression in 
two prisons. I argued that, indiscriminate violence became counter-productive, since cooperation 
did not pay off in Diyarbakir Prison.  Moreover, the intensity of the repression, paved the way 
for necessary micro and meso- level dynamics to develop in Diyarbakir Prison, such as 
alternative solidary relations, different from the organizational networks, and development of 
trust and solidarity among the inmates. The extent of the repression, namely, its denial of 
Kurdish identity and attacks towards inmates’ sexualities facilitated the sharing of a collective 
identity among the inmates. More importantly, risk-liable and people-oriented leadership in 
Diyarbakir Prison framed the situation into action for honor and pioneered for the rest. In parallel 
with O’Hearn’s case of Irish political prisoners, the leaders’ ability to taking risks on behalf of 
the followers was also a motivating factor in recruitment in Diyarbakir Prison. 
In Mamak Prison on the other hand, I argued that the selective violence was effective in 
enabling deterrence because cooperation with the soldiers paid off. Moreover, moderate level of 
repression never attacked inmates’ ethnic identities or sexualities as different from the 
Diyarbakir Prison. This difference is important for two reasons. First, those specific attacks 
against identity help clarify the distinction of “us” vs. “them,” and propel the concept of honor; 
such framing is absent in Mamak Prison.  
Second, the moderate level of repression enabled the conditions for preserving 
organizational boundaries in the prison thus, preventing alternative solidary ties to evolve and 
overcome the organizational conflicts. On top of these, I argued that leadership was task-oriented 
in Mamak prison and did not pioneer for the followers, which is very crucial in recruitment to 
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high-risk collective action. Exceptionally, female political prisoners in Mamak created a culture 
of resistance in the wards. In further research the impacts of different understanding of 
repression according to gender, the relation between space and solidarity and role of humor and 
laughter should be investigated in detail to come up with a solid analysis on female prisoners’ 
collective action experience.25 
Drawing upon Viterna’s micro-mobilization analysis, I conclude that the existence of 
opportunities and threats are not sufficient enough to form collective action in high-risk contexts. 
As Viterna states, movements take off when changing macro-level environment reshapes the 
meaning of identities people hold and the networks in which they are embedded. Thus, changes 
in the level of repression in these prisons pave the way for insurgents to reframe their identities, 
actions and networks. Especially the attacks against Kurdish identity in Diyarbakir Prison had 
the similar effect on the informers as in the Viterna’s case. Within this fluctuating order I argue 
that extreme repression in Diyarbakir Prison impeded recruitment and expansion of collective 
action at first. Collective action remained limited within the leaders cadre during September 
1980 – September 1983.  
Concomitantly, as time passed by, extreme repression turned into an opportunity to form 
alternative relationships and a shared identity among prisoners, which were crucial in 
recruitment of others to high-risk collective action. Moreover, the role of risk-liable leaders and 
how they framed their actions within the concept of honor facilitated the foundations of 
collective action in Diyarbakir Prison. As this process overlapped with the available political 
                                                 
25 See Akbas, M. (2011). Mamak Kitabi. Ankara: Ayizi Kitap.for detail. 
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opportunities in 1983, the shift into a civil government, change in the chief soldier-guardian and 
the beginning of trials, collective action further strengthened.   
On the other hand, cohabitating with right-wing political prisoners and lower level of 
repression hindered the formation of solidary relationships other than the prior organizational ties 
and a shared identity to constitute bedrock for recruitment and to overcome the prior 
organizational conflicts. Additionally, the lack of leadership skills left the reframing the 
movement in the prison insufficient to sustain collective action in Mamak Prison. As a result of 
the contingent interaction of the abovementioned dynamics, we see a more frequent and 
sustained formation of collective action in Diyarbakir Prison and scarcer and unsustainable 
instances of collective action in Mamak Prison. 
This thesis also opens questions for further research. Post-prison activism of the released 
inmates could be investigated to find out how state repression influence mobilization structures 
of the movement organizations. Another prison, such as Metris should be added to the 
comparison to be able to make more generalizations about the high-risk collective action in 
prisons. Even more, an international comparison would contribute more to the theory and the 
literature whether to see if the findings of this thesis are valid for other insurgents in similar 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AP [Adalet Partisi]: Justice Party   
CHP [Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi]: Republican People’s Party 
DDKD [Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneği]: Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association.  
DDKAD [Devrimci Demokratik Kadınlar]: Revolutionary Democratic Associations of Women   
DDKO [Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları]: Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts 
DİSK [Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu]: Confederation of Revolutionary Trade 
Unions 
FKF [Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu]: Federation of Thought Clubs   
HRFT [Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı]: The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey  
KDP [Partîya Demokrata Kurdistan] : Kurdistan Democratic Party  
KUK [Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları]: Kurdistan National Liberators 
MP [Millet Partisi]: Nation Party 
MHP [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi]: Nationalist Action Party 
MBK [Milli Birlik Komitesi]: National Unity Council   
MSP [Milli Selamet Partisi]: National Salvation Party  
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MC [Milliyetçi Cephe Koalisyon Hükümeti]: National Front Coaliton Government  
PKK [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan]: Kurdistan Workers Party 
TİP [Türkiye İşçi Partisi]: Workers Party of Turkey 
TKDP [Türkiye-Kürdistanı Demoktrat Partisi]: Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey 
T-KDP [Türkiye’de Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi]: Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey  
TKP/ML [Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist Leninist Hareketi]: Communist Party of 
Turkey/Marxist-Leninist 
TKSP [Türkiye Kürdistanı Sosyalist Partisi]: Kurdistan Socialist Party of Turkey  
THKP-C [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi]: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-
Front   
Türk-İş [Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu]:Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
YTP [Yeni Türkiye Partisi]: Party of New Turkey 
THKO [Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu]: People’s Liberation Army of Turkey  
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